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Salafi Jihadism in Post-2005 Lebanon: Causes and 
Consequences 
 
Farah Al Hassan  
 
 
Abstract 
 
The purpose of the thesis is to prove that the sectarian division in Lebanon is a 
factor that facilitates the emergence and survival of Salafi Jihadi groups in the 
country. It shows how the sectarian division, be it on the political or social level, is 
leading to a malfunctioning political system on the internal level and eventually a 
weak position in the region, thus making Lebanon more susceptible to Jihadi Islamist 
groups. The sect-based consociational system of Lebanon makes some sects feel 
disadvantaged compared to others, thus pushing those subgroups to seek the help of 
the more radical ideologies. The shared identities across borders import into Lebanon 
regional and international disputes including sectarian rivalries, which may encourage 
Salafi Jihadism in the country. Moreover, both the internal deficiency and the external 
weakness produce deadlock and weak deterrence, making governmental reactions 
towards extremist activities either slow or not entirely effective. The link that exists 
between sectarian division, its outcomes and Salafi Jihadism forms a pattern that can 
similarly be used to look into the increase in sectarian tension in Lebanon since 2005 
and the ascendancy of Salafi Jihadism ever since the civil war in Syria began in 2011. 
Once the uprisings in Syria turned violent, the sectarian division in Lebanon 
intensified and the country witnessed a rise of Salafi Jihadism. However, the extent to 
which Jihadism can grow within Lebanon remains limited due to social and political 
characteristics that distinguish the system.     
 
 
Keywords: Lebanon, Sectarian division, Salafi Jihadism, Consociationalism, 
Sectarian identity  
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 1 
Introduction 
 
The Arab Uprisings that began in 2011 did not only end the authoritarian rule 
in several of the Arab countries and demonstrate the power of the non-violent 
mobilization of the people, but it has also given an opportunity for organizations with 
an Islamist ideology to become part of the political process. After being suppressed 
for many years by the authoritarian regimes of countries like Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, 
Syria and Yemen, Islamists were finally capable of becoming actively and openly 
involved in their societies, running for elections and making it to legislative and 
executive positions1. In Tunisia, for example, the Islamic Ennahda party rose to 
power following the uprisings and managed to win 40% of the parliamentary seats 
during the elections of 20112. Similarly, in Egypt the Muslim Brotherhood did not 
only win the majority in the parliament in 2011 through the Freedom and Justice 
Party, but also won the presidential elections in 2012 through their candidate 
Mohammad Morsi3.  
Yet, the success of these “political” Islamist groups was short-lived in both 
countries4. The secular Nidaa Tounes Party took hold of the presidency in Tunisia in 
20145. As for Egypt, Mohammad Morsi was ousted with the help of the army in 
2013 and former commander of the Army Abdel Fattah el-Sisi won the Presidential 
seat later in 20146. One country, however, where the uprisings took a different 
direction especially when it came to Islamist activism, was Syria. The non-violent 
                                                             
1 (Al Anani, 2012, pp. 466-470) 
2 (Dalacoura, 2012, p. 75) 
3 (Amin, 2014, p. 393) 
4 (International Crisis Group, Understanding Islamism, 2005, pp. 6-8) Ennahda and the Muslim 
Brotherhood are considered “political” Islamist groups since they use political participation to 
reach power and advance their ideology in the system, rather than resorting to violence.  
5 (Markey & Amara, 2014, p. 1) 
6 (Amin, 2014, pp. 393-394) 
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demonstrations soon turned into an armed confrontation between the regime and 
members of the opposition. This radical change of events gave way to the 
ascendancy of new actors in Syria characterized by Jihadi Islamist groups as Jabhat 
al-Nusra for example and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria. Unlike the political 
Islamist groups in Tunisia or Egypt, the Salafi Jihadist groups in Syria believe in an 
extremist ideology characterized by the use of violence as a means to alter the 
political system employed in their country. In addition to the fact that the goal of 
these groups is to build a religious state based on the Sharia law, they are successful 
in growing financially, attracting more members from various nationalities and 
expanding their territory. As a result, the phenomenon of Salafi Jihadism became an 
international concern in general, and led to major repercussions on countries in the 
region and Lebanon in particular.  
Ever since the civil war began in Syria in 2011, Lebanon started facing a new 
set of political troubles and security challenges that were in parallel with the rising 
popularity of Salafi Jihadism within its territories. Not only did already existing 
Islamist groups regain a noteworthy degree of political and civil power, but they also 
managed to ally themselves – verbally at the least- with regional extremist 
associations that were soon capable of importing their ideology and their radical 
activism into Lebanon. Once the Arab uprisings turned violent in Syria, the Lebanese 
arena started to witness inter-communal conflicts, battles with the army, car bombs, 
and suicide bombers. The Islamist Jihadi movements– whether old or newly 
established- are well armed and ready to take action against the government and its 
institutions, political parties, communities, individuals or any other entity that 
classifies as an enemy according to their convictions. Therefore, one has to ask, why 
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is Lebanon a country susceptible to Salafi Jihadism and how has the ascendancy of 
this phenomenon been facilitated within the country?  
The aim of the study is to prove that the sectarian division that has been 
growing in Lebanon since 2005 has created a significant amount of political and 
social tension, eventually leading to an environment where the growing Jihadism in 
the region can infiltrate into Lebanon and motivate the development of similar 
groups on the local level. Choosing the year 2005 as a starting point to examine the 
increase of sectarian tension in Lebanon is especially important due to the political 
events that had been occurring ever since; the assassination of Prime Minister Rafik 
Al Hariri in 2005, the withdrawal of Syria in the same year, the 2006 Hezbollah-
Israel war, the 2008 Sunni-Shiite clashes in Beirut as well as other incidents. 
Moreover, in order to show the link between sectarianism in Lebanon and the rise of 
Salafi Jihadism within the country’s territories, the research will focus on both the 
internal and external connections that exist. The proposed argument will also be 
supported by looking into the major political events and changes that Lebanon has 
witnessed since the beginning of the turmoil in Syria in 2011.   
On the internal level, the study argues that Lebanon suffers from an ill-
functioning political system, characterized by lack of consensus and political elites 
that are more powerful than the state. This situation is directly linked to the sect-
based consociational system that has been employed to include the various sects of 
the country in the decision making process. The result is economic and social 
challenges, deadlock and weak deterrence in the form of an inability to control 
unlawful actions. Ultimately, these outcomes push many members of the Sunni 
community to embrace Salafi Jihadism, and open a gateway to the growth and 
survival of violent groups within the country.  
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As for the external level, Lebanon’s sectarian division contributed – to a great 
extent- to the country’s weak position in the region, especially that the local 
communities share their sectarian identities with societies and nations across the 
borders. The research points out that the sectarian social division in Lebanon 
produced a deeper sense of distrust among the subcultures, a lack of cohesiveness 
and eventually the need to look for external alliances. Nonetheless, these external 
powers that became close with local groups in Lebanon use, at several occasions, the 
Lebanese arena to achieve their own regional interests, sometimes even taking 
advantage of the religious sentiments in the country and the Salafi Jihadi impulses as 
a pathway to their goals. The most influential among the internal and external actors 
that facilitate the rise of Salafi Jihadism in Lebanon is the link that joins between the 
Sunni-Shiite rivalry on the external level, which is transferred into Lebanon in the 
form of a deeper social and political sectarian division, and the economic and social 
vulnerability that exists among a large number of members of the Sunni community 
in Lebanon.   
 
Review of the Literature 
Of course, several of the key subjects of this study take up a notable portion 
of the literature, particularly issues like the sectarian identity, the consociational 
political system, Lebanon’s weak position in the Middle East region and Salafi 
Jihadism in the region and in Lebanon. To begin with, since power in the political 
system became directly linked to the sect ever since the National Pact of 1943, 
tracking the origins of the sectarian identity became a major part of the literature on 
Lebanon. In fact, many writers look into the history of Lebanon to find when the sect 
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first began to gain prominence, specifically by going back to the 19th century when 
Mount Lebanon was divided under the Ottoman rule into a double Qaimmaqamiya 
and later became Mutasarrifiya7. One example is “The Culture of Sectarianism: 
Community, History, and Violence in Nineteenth-Century Ottoman Lebanon” where 
the author, Ussama Makdisi, shows the connection between the history of Lebanon 
and the rise of the sectarian identity in the country on both the social and political 
levels8.  
Yet, finding how sectarianism overshadowed the feudal system of Lebanon 
following clashes between the Maronites and the Druze both in 1841 and 1860, and 
how the 12 seats of the Mutasarrifiyah were divided equally among members of 
different sects in Mount Lebanon is only one side of the connection between the sect 
and the consociational system in Lebanon9. Actually, a significant portion of 
literature on the politics of Lebanon also focuses on the execution of the 
consociational political system following the formation of Greater Lebanon in 1920 
and more specifically after the independence of the country in 1943. The questions 
that are often examined in this part of the literature tackle the conditions under which 
the consociational system was adopted, how well does it perform in Lebanon and the 
likelihood of its endurance. 
For instance, authors like Imad Salamey in “The Government and Politics of 
Lebanon” would thoroughly analyze every incident starting from the 1860 unrest in 
Mount Lebanon, all the way to the French mandate and the independence, as well as 
                                                             
7 (Makdisi, The Culture of Sectarianism: Community, History, and Violence in Nineteenth-
Century Ottoman Lebanon, 2000, pp. 51-165) 
8 (Makdisi, The Culture of Sectarianism: Community, History, and Violence in Nineteenth-
Century Ottoman Lebanon, 2000) 
9 (Makdisi, The Culture of Sectarianism: Community, History, and Violence in Nineteenth-
Century Ottoman Lebanon, 2000, pp. 51-165) Each of the 6 sects present in Mount Lebanon 
received two seats out of the 12 designated to the council to govern Mount Lebanon. 
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agreements like the National Pact of 1943 or the Taif of 1989 in order to provide a 
clear description of the consociational path in Lebanon10. In this case, the author 
does not only aim to describe the circumstances under which the consociational 
system was adopted in Lebanon, but also to highlight the civil war period between 
1975 and 1989 when the system failed, but still was reformed and reintroduced 
through the Taif agreement in 198911. Such events raise even more questions 
concerning the consociational political system in Lebanon, including what were the 
reasons behind the failure of the system, whether the sect-based political system 
needs to be altered or not and the dangers of the sect as a source of power in the 
political system. 
Another example of an author that has tackled the failure of the system and 
its aftermath is Tom Najem in “Lebanon: The Politics of a Penetrated Society”12. 
Similar to “The Government and Politics of Lebanon”, Najem discussed events 
beyond the civil war, and looked into the changes presented in the Taif as well as the 
direct Syrian control over Lebanon13. The presence of the Syrian apparatus in 
Lebanon, and the amount of influence it had in the country also raised questions 
about the extent to which the existence hindered the progress of consociational 
democracy in Lebanon. Moreover, greater attention was directed towards Lebanon 
and the power-sharing formula employed after the assasination of Prime Minister 
Rafik Al Hariri in 2005, the Cedar Revolution, the withdrawal of Syria and 
establishment of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon shortly afterwards. 
                                                             
10 (Salamey, The Government and Politics of Lebanon, 2014, pp. 7-71) 
11 (Salamey, The Government and Politics of Lebanon, 2014, pp. 38-71) 
12 (Najem, 2012) 
13 (Najem, 2012, pp. 48-120) 
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Authors did not only show interest in trying to unfold the realities of the 
assassination or praising the peaceful demonstrations that took place in 2005, but 
they were also interested in the aftermath of such a major occurrence especially in a 
fragile system like that of Lebanon. “Crisis in the Levant: Lebanon at Risk?” by 
William W. Harris is one of the many literature works on the subject14. Also 
Hezbollah came to the forefront now; not just as a political party with an Islamic 
ambiance or a resistance movement against the Israeli occupation, but as a major 
actor – which some view as extremist and others do not- with an ability to hinder the 
course of events in Lebanon. One good example is the book of Judith Palmer Harik, 
“Hezbollah: The Changing Face of Terrorism”15. The party even gained more focus 
after it became linked to the fighting in Syria alongside the regime.  
Taking all this into consideration, it is important to note that the findings of 
Arend Lijphart, about concepts like power-sharing and consociational democracies, 
became an essential reference for several of the writings that tackle the 
concsociational model of governance in general, and in the case of Lebanon in 
particular16. The definition, conditions and application of this system as presented by 
Lijphart became a theoretical guideline to which many scholars adhered when raising 
the topic of a consociational system.  
The geographic location of Lebanon also added to the country’s appeal as a 
subject of scholarly research due to the amount of influence that external actors and 
events could exert on the domestic matters of the country. “Beware of Small States: 
Lebanon, Battleground of the Middle East” by David Hirst is one of the many 
writings that tell how Lebanon “was almost designed to be the everlasting 
                                                             
14 (Harris W. W., Crisis in the Levant: Lebanon at Risk?, 2007) 
15 (Harik J. P., 2005) 
16 (Lijphart, Consociational Democracy , 1977, pp. 25-52) 
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battleground for others’ political, strategic and ideological conflicts, conflicts which 
sometimes escalate into their proxy wars”17. Lebanon’s position in the region, often 
identified as weak, is mainly a product of the relationships that the country holds 
with issues like Palestine and the occupation dilemma, the amount of control that 
Syria had exerted over the country – and still does to an extent-, and the role that 
other regional actors like Iraq and Iran play as patrons of major sects in the country. 
One example that depicts the connection that exists between Lebanon’s position, its 
geographical location and the political changes of the Middle East region is “The 
Position of a Weak State in a Unstable Region: The Case of Lebanon” by Walid E. 
Moubarak18.  
Moreover, Lebanon’s location is a major element in identifying the 
ideologies and beliefs that not only shaped the politics of the country but also 
contributed to building the sectarian identity in Lebanon and forming every 
community’s suspicions and reservations about their position in Lebanon and the 
region. “Lebanon and the Middle Eastern Question” by Kamal Salibi is one example 
where the author explains the role that notions like Lebanese nationalism and pan-
Arabism had in the civil war of 197519. While trying to show why ending the war in 
Lebanon was directly associated with solving larger regional issues in the Middle 
East, the author provides a perfect model of how the affiliation of Lebanon’s 
Muslims with the greater Muslim Arab world and the insecurity of the Christian 
minority of Lebanon can violently divide the country for more than a decade. Even 
describing history as in “The Lebanese Identity” by Kamal Salibi as well, can serve 
the purpose of relating Lebanon’s geography with the rise of the sectarian identity in 
                                                             
17 (Hirst, 2010, pp. 2-3) 
18 (Moubarak, 2003) 
19 (Salibi K. , 1988) 
 9 
the country20. After all, a country’s location determines its history and thus the 
phases that affect its modern structure, including its political system, identities, laws, 
culture and more. Other works in the literature that are similar to the latter of Kamal 
Salibi are abundant and thorough in showing why where Lebanon lays 
geographically can clarify the connection of the Sunnis in Lebanon to regional Sunni 
powers like Saudi Arabia for example, the Shiites to Iran and the Christians to the 
west, and how do these connections affect the politics of Lebanon on both the 
internal and external levels.  
Salafi Jihadism is also a popular field in the literature. Often, Jihadism is 
tackled as one type of Islamic fundamentalism when the more general concept of 
Islamic fundamentalism is studied and clarified. For example, in “Islamic 
Fundamentalism: What it Really is and Why it Frightens the West”, the author 
Shireen T. Hunter focuses on clarifying the “misperceptions” that have been built 
around Islamic fundamentalism, and even its connection to the Sunni and the Shiite 
sects in particular21. These misconceptions eventually affect the West’s 
understanding of Islamic fundamentalism and in certain occassions the policies that 
the countries of the West adopt in order to deal with fundamentalist groups. A 
similar study is “The Truth and Illusion of Islamic Fundamentalism” by Jahangir 
Amuzegar, who after defining the term “militant Islam”, points out several 
misconceptions that are often associated with Islamic fundamentalism and militant 
Islamic groups22. Among the clarifications that the author presents are; the difficulty 
of Islamic fundamentalist unification under one group around the world, the political 
                                                             
20 (Salibi K. S., The Lebanese Identity, 1971) 
21 (Hunter, 1986, pp. 192-197) 
22 (Amuzegar, 1993) 
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aspect of Islamic fundamentalism, the various fundamentalist approaches around the 
world and the position of Islamic fundamentalists on democracy23.  
The report by the International Crisis Group “Understanding Islamism” is 
another example that tackles fundamentalism, and Salafi Jihadism as one element of 
the larger concept24. The report differentiates among the various levels of 
fundamentalism in order to identify the principles, end goals and methods employed 
by the various fundamentalist groups. After all, the phenomenon has a long history in 
the Arab region and has become a major issue of concern around the world in recent 
years. In fact, ever since the terrorist assaults on the US occurred in 2001, more 
academics have been trying to uncover the dangers that fundamentalism could pose 
on the West. Groups like Al Qaeda for example and figures with similar mentalities 
to Usama Bin Laden have definitely gained the attention of a wide number of 
scholars who seek to understand the motives and aspirations of such movements and 
their leaders.  
As for Salafi Jihadism as a topic on its own, one book that discusses Jihadists 
groups that have been dangerous to various parts of the world is “ Al Sarab” by 
Jamal Sanad Al Suwaidi25. The author looks into the specific case of Al Qaeda 
giving details about its beginnings, beliefs and position on the political changes that 
the Arab world had been witnessing since the uprisings began in 201126. In addition, 
the author takes the specific case of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria; a Jihadist 
group that was established in Syria after the civil war began, but is a major threat to 
other Arab countries of the region including Lebanon and even countries in the 
                                                             
23 (Amuzegar, 1993, pp. 128-136) 
24 (International Crisis Group, Understanding Islamism, 2005) 
25 (Al Suwaidi, 2015, pp. 463-522) 
26 (Al Suwaidi, 2015, pp. 463-502) 
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West27. Of course, Lebanon also has its share of literature on Salafi Jihadism as 
Jihadi groups became popular at some point during the civil war of 1975. In 
“Salafism in Lebanon: From Apoliticism to Transnational Jihadism”, Robert G. 
Rabil examines the origins of Jihadism, its beginnings in Lebanon and its 
development over time until the recent incidents that have taken place in Lebanon 
following the Arab uprisings and more specifically the civil war in Syria28. Similar 
studies about Islamic fundamentalism in general and Salafi Jihadism in particular are 
more significant now that the world has been witnessing a new wave of Jihadism.  
Another example is “Islamic Fundamentalism: The Story of Islamic 
Movements” by Youssef M. Choueiri, is also an example of a book that thoroughly 
discusses Islamic fundamentalism and the rise of what the author calls 
“radicalism”29. Since the main aim of the author was to prove that Islamic 
fundamentalism has long existed in specific parts of the world, the author thoroughly 
discusses the stages of fundamentalism beginning with “revivalism”, “reformism” 
and finally “radicalism”30.  
Nonetheless, Lebanon, Jihadi Salafism, and sectarianism have been combined 
based on two patterns; either by taking Lebanon as a case study of a sectarian 
political system or a country where Jihadi Salafism exists, or by showing that a 
wrong sectarian power distribution will result in more Islamic radicalism in the 
country. The literature does not, however, show the cause/effect relationship that 
exists between the sectarian division in Lebanon and the rise of Islamic extremism in 
the country, regardless of the sectarian power sharing formula employed.  Thus, the 
                                                             
27 (Al Suwaidi, 2015, pp. 502-522) 
28 (Rabil, Religion, National Identity, and Confessional Politics in Lebanon: The Challenge of 
Islamism , 2011) 
29 (Choueiri, 2010) 
30 (Choueiri, 2010, pp. 13-236) 
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study will add by presenting a pattern that explains how the sectarian division affects 
the country on both the internal and external levels, thus becoming a primary trigger 
of the problematic outcome.  
 
Methodology and Importance of the Topic 
The data collected from primary and secondary sources of information are 
essential in grasping the origins of the sectarian division and understanding the role 
that identity, geography, and history have played in forming this division. Reliable 
books, journal articles and published reports will be used to outline the periods that 
had the most significant effect in the formation of the present day system in 
Lebanon. Moreover, sources that have talked about, defined, or analyzed the main 
ideas of the research - the sectarian division in Lebanon, the sect-based 
consociational system, and Lebanon’s position in the Middle East region and the 
connection of those to the rise of Jihadi Salafism in Lebanon- are essential to the 
study. Furthermore, numerical data will also be useful in supporting some of the 
ideas related either to poverty, education, unemployment and other similar subjects 
in Lebanon. Yet, the research has several margins that need to be identified. 
First, some of the main terms presented in the argument of the study must be 
defined.  Beginning with the sectarian division in Lebanon, it refers to the rivalry 
between the major sects of the country – Maronites, Sunni, Shiite and Druze- on both 
the political and social level. Politically, the sectarian division is reflected through 
the political competition present in the legislative and executive body, and 
manifested itself in governmental deadlock and ineffective decisions. As for 
sectarian division on the social level, it is expressed through the lack of trust that has 
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grown between the sectarian subcultures in Lebanon, leading to feelings of suspicion 
between the communities and accusations of bias and inequality towards the 
authorities. Both forms of division, and especially between the Sunnis and the Shiites 
of Lebanon, promotes the use of Islamist extremist groups as a tool by some local 
political parties to advance their agendas and challenge the power of their opponents, 
or by regional powers as a form of a proxy competition, or even as a substitute to 
official representation especially by the Sunni community due to feelings of 
marginalization. 
As for Islamic fundamentalism, since the term is broad and has no one 
comprehensive definition, conditions of its use in this study must be clarified. As a 
result, the general understanding of Islamic fundamentalism relies upon Youssef M. 
Choueiri’s statement that “Islamic radicalism is a politico-cultural movement that 
postulates a qualitative contradiction between western civilization and the religion of 
Islam. Its emphasis on Islam as a comprehensive and transcendental worldview 
excludes the validity of all other systems and values, and dictates an apparent 
restitution of a normative set of beliefs untainted by historical change”31. However, 
the study is specifically concerned with one type of fundamentalism and thus 
wordings as Islamists, Islamist extremism, Islamic radicalism, extremists, 
fundamentalists and the like will be referring to what the International Crisis Group 
has classified in “Understanding Islamism” as Sunni Jihadi groups.  
The report differentiates among three Sunni Islamist groups; “political 
Islamic” movements, “missionary” movements, and “Jihadi” movements32. The first, 
political Islamic groups are the most peaceful form of Islamic fundamentalism, 
                                                             
31 (Choueiri, 2010, p. 157) 
32 (International Crisis Group, Understanding Islamism, 2005, pp. 1-18) 
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which seek to induce change by becoming part of the political system rather than 
using violence to undermine the existence of the nation-state. The second, 
missionary movements are solely concerned with safeguarding the principles of 
being a true and a good Muslim33. As for Jihadi groups, they can be divided into 
three types; “internal” fighting against local regimes, “irredentist” trying to push 
non-Muslims out of specific territories, and “global” resisting the policies of the 
West. Jihadi groups, which are all violent, could also be separated into “salafis” and 
“Qutbists”. The latter are the followers of Sayyid Qutb and have a line of enemies 
starting from internal regimes all the way to countries of the West, salafi jihadists, on 
the other hand, are those who have adopted violent Jihad after being peaceful in 
spreading the values of Islam34. While all three Sunni Islamist groups may exist in 
Lebanon, this study is mainly directed towards the salafi Jihadists – with a mix of 
internal, irredentists, and to a lesser extent global characteristics- who currently pose 
the greatest threat to the security and political stability of Lebanon. Moreover, the 
terms Salafi jihadism and salafi/salafists are used differently in the research based on 
their distinct implications. Although salafists are strict in following the Sharia in 
every aspect of their lives and not only the spiritual one, a great number of salafists 
refrain from the use of violence as a means to spread the rulings of religion35. Those 
members that rather choose the non-peaceful methods are known as the salafi 
jihadists.  
Second, it is also important to note that Hezbollah will not be addressed as 
one of the Islamic fundamentalist groups. On one hand, a significant number of 
scholars consider Hezbollah an Islamic fundamentalist organization with a radical 
                                                             
33 (International Crisis Group, Understanding Islamism, 2005, pp. 6-14) 
34 (International Crisis Group, Understanding Islamism, 2005, pp. 14-18) 
35 (Saab & Ranstorp, 2007, pp. 826-827) 
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jihadist agenda, especially that Shiite fundamentalism does take up a part in the 
readings of the literature. The armed branch of Hezbollah is also an important aspect 
of the party that is important to the study, considering the fact that it is a very 
controversial political and security topic in Lebanon. Even though the party identifies 
its well-established armed base as a resistance movement in the face of the Israeli 
occupation of some regions in Lebanon, this motive has lost a major amount of 
public support ever since the liberation of occupied lands in 2000 and the events of 
May 7 in 200836. The party, however, still uses the card of the occupied Shebaa 
farms. On the other hand, Hezbollah’s charter and goals did include establishing an 
Islamic state in Lebanon before the party began the process of “lebanonization” and 
took part in the parliamentary elections for the first time in 199237. The ideals of the 
party had also been inspired to a great extent from the Shiite sect in Islam and the 
Wilayat al Fakih of the Iranian Ruhollah Khomeini. However, Hezbollah will be 
tackled as one of the sect-based political parties in Lebanon rather than a radical 
Islamist group.  
Third, as stated previously, there are many reasons that can lead to the 
emergence of the Islamic fundamentalist ideology in a certain state or region. Poor 
economic standards, social inequality, high unemployment rates and 
underemployment are all factors that might push people- especially the youth- to 
believe that their only way out is through the application of extremist interpretations 
of religion. This research will be taking into consideration these elements, but will 
dig deeper into finding one – sectarian division- that is more unique to the political 
composition of Lebanon. Therefore, economic marginalization and corruption will 
                                                             
36 (Najem, 2012, pp. 80-81) In May of 2008, members from the Shiite parties of Hezbollah and 
Amal clashed in Beirut with Sunnis who were mainly supporters of the Future Movement.  
37 (Rabil, Religion, National Identity, and Confessional Politics in Lebanon: The Challenge of 
Islamism , 2011, p. 62) 
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be highlighted through exposing the down sides of the sect-based consociational 
system of Lebanon, and the economic and social drives toward Islamic 
fundamentalism will be linked to the sect-based political system of the country.   
On a further note, the significance of tackling the relationship between 
sectarianism in Lebanon and the rise of Salafi Jihadism has two distinct dimensions. 
First, sectarianism is a reality under which a total of almost 4 million citizens are 
living and bearing the consequences of, especially that a considerable number of 
people still believe that the sect-based political system is the best way to handle the 
diversity of the Lebanese society. However, the sectarian division on the social and 
political level has not only weakened the state or impaired living standards, but has 
also increased the risks of damage now that religious extremism became a fact that 
the state has to deal with. As for the second dimension, taking this topic into 
consideration is one way of figuring the connection between sectarianism and Salafi 
Jihadism in Lebanon, and how a state that operates under a sect-based consociational 
system becomes a fertile ground that radicalism has resorted to in order to grow. At 
the same time, drawing this link is one way to understand how a country like 
Lebanon responds to the threat of Salafi Jihadism, how do the various political 
groups react to this phenomenon and what are the elements that determine the course 
of action in the country in such a situation. In other words, do political groups 
tolerate the presence of Jihadist groups in the country, if yes then why and for how 
long?  
Keeping in mind that the aim is to draw a link between the sectarian division 
in Lebanon and the ascendancy of Salafi Jihadism, the study is divided into three 
chapters followed by a concluding summary on the matter discussed. Even though 
the study is divided between an internal and an external situation, they are very much 
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connected that often one leads to the other. The research does not provide an 
alternative to the sect-based consociational system, but tries to prove that a problem 
exists; thus suggesting another flaw that can grow out of the sectarian political 
system in Lebanon. In addition, although the study gives special attention to the 
period post-2005, earlier events will still play a major role in the analysis. 
Chapter 1 shows how the political system employed in Lebanon can be a 
facilitating factor in the emergence of Islamic fundamentalism in the country. 
Therefore, since Lebanon has a consociational system, the chapter relies on Arend 
Lijphart’s definition and characteristics of a consociational system as a framework38. 
The chapter first looks into the reasons that make Lebanon a country fit for 
consociationalism, when was the system first used and how is the system applied. 
The chapter then examines the downside of the sect-based power distribution in 
Lebanon by pointing out how consensus between the various factions became a 
difficult task especially during the post-2005 period. The chapter finally discusses 
how the defected consociational system produces weak institutions that are 
controlled by patronage networks, eventually pushing some groups to adopt the 
ideology of Salafi Jihadism as an alternative. The last section of Chapter 1 will also 
point out the difficulty of producing decisions under the consociational political 
system of Lebanon and weak deterrence abilities of the Lebanese authorities, which 
ultimately facilitate the growth of armed Islamist extremist groups.  
Chapter 2 looks into the role of the sectarian identity in Lebanon in building 
affiliations across the borders of the country, the pressure on the political system in 
Lebanon as a result of its location and how does Salafi Jihadism fit into this. The 
chapter shows how each of the major sects in Lebanon – Shite, Sunni, Maronite and 
                                                             
38 (Lijphart, Consociational Democracy , 1977, pp. 25-52) 
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Druze- has built over time a connection with a regional or international ally as a 
source of both power and protection. Chapter 2 also discusses the impact of the 
regional Sunni-Shiite rivalry on Lebanon as well as that of the Palestinian issue, and 
then continues to examine the link between the sectarian identity, location and the 
rise of Salafi Jihadism in Lebanon.  
As for Chapter 3, it is to apply the proposed relationship between sectarian 
division and the rise of Salafi Jihadism in Lebanon, since the civil war in Syria began 
in 2011. After briefly outlining the main events that helped escalate sectarian tension 
in Lebanon since 2005, the chapter will then present two case studies from Tripoli 
and Sidon. Both of these case studies are examples of post-2011 incidents when 
sectarian division and interests led to governmental deadlock, a delayed support for 
the concerned authorities to take action and eventually an armed conflict between a 
Jihadist group and the official authorities. Finally, the chapter will end by listing a 
number of reasons that explain why even though Lebanon confronted Jihadist groups 
– and may need to face the challenge again-, those groups remain supported by a 
very limited minority that is incapable yet of taking over the system in the country.  
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Chapter 1 
 
Internal Politics and Fundamentalist Motivations 
According to Iliya Harik in “The Ethnic Revolution and Political Integration in 
the Middle East”, although members of the same ethnic identity had been separate during 
the Ottoman rule due to “differences in religion, language, geography, and authority 
structure”, ethnic conflict only came to the forefront with the rise of new communication 
methods that facilitated the movement of the people and increased interaction among the 
various communities39. The changes that occurred in communication led to “suspicion, 
reluctance to mix, tensions, and often rejections” among members of different ethnic 
groups40.  
The solution pursued was the unification of each of the ethnic groups under a 
single entity, whereby “ the ethnic group is called a nation and ethnic sentiment of unity 
is called nationalism” 41. Eventually, several of the ethnic communities were joined 
together in the same nations leading either to a repression of the minority by the larger 
groups, or employing “ a modicum of reasonable relations but with mutual political 
suspicion and lack of cooperation”42. Lebanon fits in the latter group of nations where the 
Druze and Maronites- dominated Mount Lebanon was expanded in 1920 to include 
several other sects, thus introducing new actors to the internal political scene whose 
shares of power have been distributed through a sect-based consociational system43. 
                                                             
39 (Harik I. F., 1972 , pp. 304-308) 
40 (Harik I. F., 1972 , p. 309) 
41 (Harik I. F., 1972 , p. 309) 
42 (Harik I. F., 1972 , p. 310) 
43 (Salamey, The Government and Politics of Lebanon, 2014, pp. 14-37) Following the Second World 
War and the downfall of the Ottoman Empire, France took control over Lebanon as agreed upon in 
the Balfour Declaration. Afterwards, Greater Lebanon was formed after adding new territories like 
Tripoli, Sidon and the Bekaa. These Muslim-dominated regions changed the sectarian demographics 
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After 1920 Lebanon encompasses along side the Druze and the Maronites several 
sects including Sunnis, Shiites, Greek Orthodox, Greek Catholics and Armenians along 
side smaller communities as the Alawites and the Siracs for example. With this internal 
diversity comes a sense of distrust and suspicion among the different groups, which either 
develops out of being a minority in a larger homogenous region- as in the case of 
Lebanese Christians and Shiites- or by belonging to a majority that fears it is losing its 
power due to the absence of the right representation and the growing power of the rivals – 
as in the case of the Sunnis of Lebanon. While the former are afraid of being forced to 
submit to the control of the larger faction or to flee the region, the latter are convinced 
that the minorities have their international or regional allies, as Iran for example or the 
West, plotting to weaken them. Ultimately, both sides feel the urge to defend their 
culture; hence, internally working closely to ensure that members of their respective sects 
are well united and are a part of the power structure, and externally associating 
themselves with cross border identities or allying with more powerful actors of the 
international system. 
This section of the study is solely concerned with the first form of defense. 
Therefore, taking this into consideration the first question to answer is; how does the 
sectarian identity, and eventually sectarian division, affect the consociational political 
system of Lebanon and where does the ascendancy of Salafi Jihadism fit into this 
equation? In order to answer this question, the chapter will begin by going back to when 
consociational democracy first came into effect in Lebanon and examine the factors that 
made Lebanon eligible to operate this system based on Arend Lijphart’s work44. The 
discussion will specifically focus on the rise of the sectarian identity in Lebanon, the 
                                                                                                                                                                            
of Lebanon and ultimately pushed for the creation of a sect-based power sharing formula that was 
officially introduced through the National Pact in 1943.   
44 (Lijphart, Consociational Democracy , 1977) 
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prerequisites of a consociational democracy and the four major features of a 
consociational system.  
The second section of the chapter will also be based on Arend Lijphart’s 
theoretical framework of consociational democracy. The chapter will go over the 
incidents during which the consociational system failed, focusing on the events of 2005 
onwards, and looking into the elements that explain this failure especially when the 
political system of Lebanon is derived from the sectarian nature of the Lebanese society. 
The chapter will then end by identifying how the sect-based system weakens the state’s 
institutions, produces deadlock and weak deterrence, thus giving way for the Islamic 
fundamentalist ideology to exist and develop in Lebanon.  
 
The Consociational Solution 
Interaction among the people of Mount Lebanon had been, for a long time, based on 
feudal premises. The population was divided between commoners and feudal chiefs, 
without much attention being given to their Druze or Maronite identities. Peasants were 
responsible to the Sheikhs, who in turn ran local affairs through collaboration with other 
notables of the mountain. Even the religious representatives had given in to this 
employed order45. It was in 1840 when the first strings of sectarianism appeared in Mount 
Lebanon, as clashes between the Maronites and the Druze of the region broke out on 
several occasions46. In fact, the first attempt at reconciliation was in 1842 when the 
region was divided into a double Qaimmaqamiya; one under a Maronite rule and the 
                                                             
45 (Makdisi, The Culture of Sectarianism: Community, History, and Violence in Nineteenth-Century 
Ottoman Lebanon, 2000, pp. 28-50) 
46 (Makdisi, The Culture of Sectarianism: Community, History, and Violence in Nineteenth-Century 
Ottoman Lebanon, 2000) 
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other under a Druze one47. Later in 1861, after a more intense dispute between the 
Maronites and the Druze, the Europeans and the Ottomans introduced a new order in 
Mount Lebanon; the Mutasarrifiya. This time the sect was officially recognized as a 
distinguishing social and political factor when a consociational-inspired council was put 
together, distributing a total of 12 seats among 6 different sectarian identities48.   
Years after, when Greater Lebanon was established, the sectarian identity started to 
gain a more prominent role in the domestic affairs of the country. Now that the society 
became more heterogeneous and the territory increased, the amount of influence that 
every sect could impose on internal politics changed as well. The various groups became 
skeptic of one another fearing being dominated or repressed by any other faction whose 
power surpasses theirs. Therefore, every group demanded guarantees on their shares of 
power in the government, thus producing the sect-based consociational system under 
which the state functions. 
The purpose behind a power-sharing formula is to build a system that allows a 
culturally heterogeneous society to solve its disputes within the governmental context.  
As per the definition of Arend Lijphart, “consociational democracy means government by 
elite cartel designed to turn a democracy with a fragmented political culture into a stable 
democracy”49. Lijphart continues to explain that such a political approach has a higher 
chance of succeeding in the presence of a specific setting, compiling a set of 
preconditions under three broad titles: “inter-subcultural relations at the elite level”, 
“inter-subcultural relations at the mass level” and “elite-mass relations within the 
                                                             
47 (Salamey, The Government and Politics of Lebanon, 2014, pp. 16-18) 
48 (Makdisi, The Culture of Sectarianism: Community, History, and Violence in Nineteenth-Century 
Ottoman Lebanon, 2000, p. 159) 
49 (Lijphart, Consociational Democracy, 1969, p. 216) 
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subcultures”50. Lebanon is one country case that had these criteria by the time a 
confessional system was officially adopted for the first time in the state of Greater 
Lebanon under the National Pact of 194351. 
The first prerequisite to a consociational system that Lebanon actually had during the 
years leading to its independence is the common hazard of the French mandate, which 
resided from the end of the World War I until the country’s independence was officially 
recognized in 194352. Prior to the mandate, Mount Lebanon along with its neighboring 
entities – and several other parts of the region- had been subjects of the Ottoman Empire 
for four centuries. Therefore, by the time that Greater Lebanon with its new territories 
was promised independence in 1941, all the various groups in the country were eager to 
become sovereign. Since the promise was not fulfilled as they desired, they took it upon 
themselves to claim their own independence forcing the French to acknowledge it in 
1943 and totally depart out of Lebanon by 194653.  
Even when President Bechara El Khoury and Prime Minister Riad El Solh drew 
together the National Pact, they gave a substantial amount of attention to solve a debate 
over another matter that can be considered a double-edged external threat to the 
communities in Lebanon; the identity of the country. By realizing the necessity of having 
all groups submit to the Arab character of Lebanon; Christians would no longer seek the 
protection of the West especially that of the European countries like France and the 
                                                             
50 (Lijphart, Consociational Democracy, 1969) 
51 (Salamey, The Government and Politics of Lebanon, 2014, pp. 14-37) Before Greater Lebanon was 
established in 1920, a council with consociational features existed in the Mutasarrifiya of Mount 
Lebanon.  
52 (Lijphart, Consociational Democracy, 1969, p. 217) The first aspect of “inter-subcultural relations 
at the elite level” is having an “external threat” facing the country. 
53 (Salamey, The Government and Politics of Lebanon, 2014, p. 29) President Bechara El Khoury, 
Prime Minister Riad El Solh along with a number of other members of the government were jailed in 
Rashaya after they declared Lebanon’s independence, without consulting with the French 
authorities, by amending constitutional articles related to the French mandate.  
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Muslims would drop their ambition to revive the Sunni dominated territory of Greater 
Syria making Lebanon a part of it. 
A second requirement that Arend Lijphart has pointed out as essential to the survival 
of a consociatinal model of governance and that Lebanon did meet was the absence of an 
absolute majority among its multi-sectarian society54. According to the 1932 census, 
while the Lebanese Christians were slightly more in number than the Lebanese Muslims, 
none of the sects held a population number that would allow it to dominate the rest. The 
Christians made up almost 50% of the population and the Muslims were around 48%. 
Although the Maronites were the largest sect making up almost 28.7% of the population, 
the Sunni Muslims were not so far being nearly at 22.5%55.  
Moreover, in Lebanon’s early years of post-independence the country enjoyed a 
somewhat relaxed economic and social status. In other words, Lebanon had a “relatively 
low total load on the decision-making apparatus”56. On one hand, Lebanon had been an 
economic and touristic hub benefitting from its strategic location between three 
continents, its shorelines on the Mediterranean, the nature of its land, and being the most 
liberal among the countries of the region. On the other hand, as a small country Lebanon 
had little to be involved in on the international level and so was “more likely to escape 
the onerous burdens entailed by an active foreign policy”57.  
Not to forget, under the French mandate and abiding by the Sykes-Picot agreement 
designed by the French and the British, the formerly Ottoman ruled cities of Beirut, 
Tripoli, Sidon, Tyre and the Bekaa valley were added to the autonomous Mount Lebanon 
                                                             
54 (Lijphart, Consociational Democracy, 1969, pp. 217-218) The second aspect of “inter-subcultural 
relations at the elite level” is the presence of a “multiple balance of power among the subcultures”.  
55 (Maktabi, 1999, pp. 234-235) 
56 (Lijphart, Consociational Democracy, 1969, p. 218) 
57 (Lijphart, Consociational Democracy, 1969, p. 219) 
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in 1920 forming the present day Lebanon58. The Maronite fear, as a regional minority, of 
being dragged into the Muslim Arab world and the Sunni trust that an Arab unification 
can still happen made it clear that the line dividing the two communities was a sharp one 
similar to what Lijphart pictures to be needed on the public level for a consociational 
system to survive59. Admitting to the Arab identity of Lebanon in 1943 did ease the 
tension between the Christians and the Sunnis creating a better environment for 
collaboration, but did not elevate affinity towards Lebanese nationalism enough so that it 
can overshadow the old identity convictions; at least not for the Sunnis whose desires 
were awakened by the Syrian-Egyptian unification under the United Arab Republic in 
1958. As the idea of an integrated Muslim region lingered in the minds of the Sunnis, the 
Druze did not seem to be troubled by the rising popularity of pan-Arabism, the Shiite 
voice was still a minor one and the Maronites saw in the building of their own state 
within the former borders of Mount Lebanon a last resort. 
These disparities were further entrenched by the type of networks that often come to 
exist between affiliates of the same communities in Lebanon. The first of these networks 
is the family. The ties that are usually formed within a certain family are not only 
important on a personal level, but are also useful on the political level as well. Providing 
services to family members is a common way of expanding the loyalty circle of a 
political leader belonging to that family. The same is true when it comes to the role of the 
“zaim” or the leader of a subculture, as pledging absolute support for the zaim of the 
party is not something unusual. On the contrary, a devotee of the party is likely to receive 
benefits in return for his/her allegiance60. It is also not surprising if these loyalties are 
                                                             
58 (Salamey, The Government and Politics of Lebanon, 2014, p. 24) 
59 (Lijphart, Consociational Democracy, 1969, pp. 219-221) Under “inter subcultural relations at the 
mass level” talks about how “distinct lines of cleavages” in a society are favorable to the formation 
of a consociational democracy.   
60 (Khalaf, 1968, pp. 246-259) 
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preserved throughout generations in parallel with the transfer of power from father to son 
or father to brother.  
Likewise, citizens who belong to the same religion, and more specifically the same 
sect, also tend to construct their own network of loyalty exchange for privileges. The 
multiple sects of the country are mostly represented through the local parties and so the 
head of the party also becomes a prominent figure of the sect61. Accordingly, spiritual 
beliefs become the shared feature upon which the patterns of connection are assembled. 
Yet, since the zaim is a member of a certain family and also the leader of one of the sects 
represented in a party that he heads, each of the sectarian parties will then be directly 
linked to a specific family name. As one author states, “It is often difficult to determine 
which came first, kinship or confessional loyalty; suffice it to say that the two variables 
were mutually reinforcing”.62 
Although each of these linkages has helped the sectarian groups in Lebanon become 
stronger, more coherent on the inside and brought every subculture closer to its leader, 
they also widened the gap between the sects and made it acceptable that power remains 
exclusive to the same elites over time63.  
Lijphart also talks about four characteristics that are vital to the continuity of a 
consociational system; “grand coalition”, “mutual veto”, “proportionality” and 
“segmental autonomy and federalism”64. Thus, seeing that Lebanon satisfied the 
                                                             
61 (Khalaf, 1968, pp. 259-263) 
62 (Hamzeh, Clientalism, Lebanon: Roots and Trends , 2001, p. 171) 
63 (Lijphart, Consociational Democracy, 1969, pp. 221-222) Two issues must exist at the “elite-mass 
relations within the subcultures”; “adequate articulation of the interests of the subcultures” and 
“widespread approval of the principle of government by elite cartel”.  
64 (Lijphart, Consociational Democracy , 1977, pp. 25-52) 
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prerequisites deemed necessary for a consociational democracy, how was this system 
applied in the Lebanese political arena? 
Beginning with the first element, it is important that “political leaders of all 
significant segments of the plural society cooperate in a grand coalition to govern the 
country”65. In the case of Lebanon, this first condition was fulfilled when the National 
Pact assigned the highest governmental positions to the major sects of the country. Ever 
since, a Maronite has occupied the presidential seat, while a Sunni represented the 
premiership and the speaker of the parliament is always a Shiite. This division of power 
also paved the way for the second constituent of a consociational democracy, mutual 
veto. Each of the Lebanese sects and support groups are given a certain amount of 
authority, relative to their governmental appointment, that they can use to dismiss 
working on a particular topic.  
Even proportionality was perfectly depicted in the parliament. Based on the data 
collected from the census of 1932, the ratio of six Christians to five Muslims became the 
standard of distributing parliamentary seats and allocating the top civil service posts66. As 
for the last factor, and although Lebanon has always been considered too small to be 
turned into a federation and many of its regions are filled with people from different 
sects, the subgroups still enjoyed a noteworthy degree of autonomy if they belonged to an 
area that was religiously homogenous. Missionary schools, local clinics, hospitals, social 
organizations, religious courts and religious houses were -and still are- an expression of 
that autonomy that members of every sect had.   
 
                                                             
65 (Lijphart, Consociational Democracy , 1977, p. 25) 
66 The 6:5 ratio between the Christians and the Muslims was later modified by the Taif agreement in 
1989 to become an equal ratio of 5:5.  
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Defected Consociationalism 
At many times the societal feelings of skepticism, which originate from linguistic, 
racial, ethnic or any other kind of disparity, are overlooked or reverted. However, in other 
situations the differences are highlighted to the extent that little room is left for 
productive cooperation, similar to the illustration in Lebanon’s sect-based consociational 
system. While it seemed that the consociational form of governance was serving Lebanon 
well, it soon began to face obstacles out of which some led to the utter failure of the 
system. 
One example is the brief tensions that were witnessed in 1958. On one hand, the 
president at that time, Camille Chamoun, was accused by the pan-Arab Muslims of the 
country of being pro-western after he hesitated to show support for Egypt against the 
West during the 1956 crisis of the Suez Canal. On the other hand, the Christians were 
worried that the merging between Egypt and Syria in 1958 would motivate local the 
Muslim community to try joining the short-lived United Arab Republic67.  
A more serious episode of consociational failure was the Lebanese civil war that 
erupted in 1975. Demographic changes, internal pressures to modify the power-sharing 
formula or to totally abolish it, the clash of ideologies between the Lebanese nationalists 
and pan-Arabs, the rise of the Palestinian question and the influx of refugees were all 
transformations that the consociational system could not handle. After fifteen consecutive 
years of conflict, the confrontations only ended upon the enactment of the Taif agreement 
in 1989.  
The chaos that took over Lebanon for fifteen years definitely destroyed the executive 
and parliamentary political cycles as well as the power-sharing consensus. In addition to 
                                                             
67 (Salamey, The Government and Politics of Lebanon, 2014, pp. 34-35) 
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the fact that a primary cause of the civil war at the time was Sunni dissatisfaction with the 
consociational formula and Maronite fear of the change that would occur in the balance 
of power if the power-sharing formula was reformed to satisfy the Sunnis, the political 
system of the country was paralyzed with the absence of security in the country68. 
Moreover, the influx of Palestinian refugees after 1967, the Palestinian intervention in the 
internal politics of Lebanon and the Sunni alliance with the Palestinian movements in an 
attempt to shift the internal balance of power to their favor further exacerbated the 
political tension in the country. The parliamentary elections came to a halt during the war 
period as the last elections were held in 1972 until regular political activity was restored 
in 199269. The cabinet also faced numerous strains as Sunni Prime Ministers found 
difficulty to balance between their support to the local Sunni demands and the overall 
situation of the country.  
In fact, the situation of the government further deteriorated when it was divided 
between the power of General Michel Aoun who was appointed temporarily by President 
Amin Gemayel following difficulty to elect a new president, and the authority of Salim 
Al Hoss who has already been a Prime Minister under the presidency of Gemayel70. As 
for the army, it had been accused of being pro-Christian as early as the war began when it 
received orders to fight against the Palestinian groups in Lebanon whom the Muslims 
tried to support ever since their influx into Lebanon began after 196771. Even later, by the 
                                                             
68 The Sunni community in Lebanon demanded a greater share of power, while the Maronites 
believed that giving the Sunnis – in particular and the Muslims in general- more power would threat 
their own power in the country and their existence in the region as a whole. Eventually, after the Taif 
came into effect, the Muslims of Lebanon did receive a greater share of power. The Maronites lost a 
significant amount of their power, especially when several of the Maronite President’s political 
advantages were shifted to the position of the Sunni Prime Minister.  
69 (Salamey, The Government and Politics of Lebanon, 2014, p. 58) 
70 (Najem, 2012, pp. 42-43) Although the Christians may have accepted General Michel Aoun as a 
Maronite Prime Minister, the Muslims of the country rallied behind Salim Al Hoss who was a Sunni 
Prime Minister as per the National Pact agreement of 1943.  
71 (Salibi K. S., Cross Roads to Civil War: Lebanon 1958-1976, 1976, pp. 90-97) The first signs of Sunni 
dissatisfaction with the performance of the Army came to the front when residents from Sidon 
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end of the war, the Army fought somewhat personal wars between their commander 
Michel Aoun and his opponents, specifically the Lebanese Forces and the Syrian army. 
These confrontations were a result of Aoun’s failed attempts to take control over the 
Christian areas, drive the Syrian apparatus out of Lebanon and object against the 
implementation of the Taif72. 
Yet, even though the Taif helped bring the civil war to an end, the agreement also 
contributed a few elements to the deficiency in the consociational system of Lebanon. On 
one hand, the changes in the distribution of power presented by the Taif are problematic. 
First, shifting a great share of authority from the position of the Maronite President to the 
cabinet headed by a Sunni Prime Minister aggravated the feelings of marginalization 
among the Maronites of the country73. Second, as has been the case since the 
consociational system was first introduced by the National Pact in 1943, the division of 
power among the three main figures of the government, or what is referred to as the 
“troika” – meaning the president, prime minister and speaker of the parliament-, is not 
always practical. If the three parties were in agreement political affairs would run 
smoothly, however disagreement among the three often leads to deadlock that may 
require a series of negotiations and concessions to be solved74.  
On the other hand, the lack of proper execution of the Taif is another factor that has 
negatively affected the political system in Lebanon. Not only has the clause on the 
“abolition of political sectarianism” through a “phased plan” been disregarded, but also 
                                                                                                                                                                            
clashed with the armed forces following the killing of Maarouf Saad by the Army during a fishermen 
demonstration in Sidon. Later, the Sunni animosity towards the Lebanese Army grew as the latter 
fought Palestinian groups on several occasions.  
72 (Najem, 2012, pp. 42-43) Although Michel Aoun tried to fight the Syrian presence in Lebanon and 
expressed his disapproval of the Taif Accord, the Syrian retaliation and the international desire to 
bring the Taif into effect drove Michel Aoun into exile until 2005.  
73 (The Taif Agreement) 
74 (Moubarak, 2003, pp. 22-23) 
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was the section describing the timeline of the Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon75. 
According to the Taif, the Lebanese authorities were to take control over the Lebanese 
territories within two years after the agreement was signed, and the Syrian troops were to 
withdraw to the Biqaa before a complete departure from Lebanon76. However, the Syrian 
apparatus remained in Lebanon for an additional 15 years after the civil war had ended. 
Ultimately, the Syrian presence further defected the consociational system of Lebanon by 
taking control of local and foreign decision-making and depriving Lebanon of its 
sovereignty. In fact, Syria preserved its control over Lebanon through a set of strategies 
that the Syrian apparatus employed and by taking advantage of the political deficiencies 
in Lebanon.  
One, in order to maintain its influence over the politics of Lebanon, Syria managed 
to spread its authority into every part of the system that could affect its presence in 
Lebanon. In the parliament for instance, representatives were often allies of Syria since 
the electoral districts were distributed in such a way that a significant number of its 
political supporters would win seats in the parliament77. Even in the cabinet 
governmental decisions reflected the interests of Syria, and the various media outlets 
avoided criticizing the Syrian apparatus in order to escape any form of oppression that 
could result as a reaction to their work78. Two, Syria also took control over the foreign 
decisions of Lebanon. In addition to the fact that Lebanon signed treaties that connected 
the country economically and politically to Syria, some of these treaties linked the two 
countries in foreign matters as well79. Perhaps the most important of these treaties is the 
“Treaty of Brotherhood, Cooperation and Coordination Between the Syrian Arab 
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77 (Salamey, The Government and Politics of Lebanon, 2014, p. 113) 
78 (Fakhoury, 2009, pp. 140-141) 
79 (Moubarak, 2003, pp. 18-20) 
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Republic and The Lebanese Republic” signed shortly after the end of the civil war in 
May of 199180. After all, Lebanon was part of Syria’s negotiations process with Israel 
over peace in the region and retrieving the Golan Heights that were occupied in 1967. By 
continuing to affect the decision-making process in Lebanon, and more importantly the 
actions of Hezbollah, Syria held a source of pressure over Israel and therefore an 
advantage as a power in the region81.  
Three, although the Syrian control over the politics in Lebanon has greatly 
contributed to the malfunctioning of the country’s consociational system since the 
country had lost its sovereignty to a foreign power, the sect-based structure also 
facilitated the Syrian take over in the country. On one hand, the deadlock that resulted 
from the “troika” arrangement often needed a third party intervention, a role that Syria 
occupied during its presence in Lebanon up until 200582. On the other hand, since 
feelings of distrust among the various communities in Lebanon push members of these 
groups to seek the support of an external ally, and due to the constant struggle among the 
“zaims” of the sects to stay in power, the Syrian influence in Lebanon was further 
validated through the networks that were built between the Syrian apparatus and a major 
number of the political actors in Lebanon83. One way to secure a party’s share of power 
in any branch of the political system was through preserving a close relationship with 
Syria.     
Many years later, and as of the Syrian withdrawal in 2005 Lebanon regained its 
sovereignty and the political regime went back to being locally operated84. Yet again the 
consociational system stumbled on several occasions. In 2006 the principle of mutual 
                                                             
80 (United Nations Peacemaker, 1992) 
81 (Moubarak, 2003, pp. 20-22) 
82 (Fakhoury, 2009, p. 188) 
83 (Fakhoury, 2009, p. 189) 
84 Even though the decision making process could still be influenced by regional and international 
actors, Lebanon had no foreign army within its territories anymore.  
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veto backfired when members of the March 8 coalition resigned from their ministerial 
seats leaving the government nearly paralyzed, in June of the same year a Hezbollah-
Israeli war broke out, and in 2007 the presidential position was left empty after failure to 
elect a successor to President Emile Lahoud before the Lebanese political arena finally 
erupted in 2008. All the friction that had been growing ever since Prime Minister Rafik 
Al Hariri was assassinated in February of 2005 was diverted into an armed battle on the 
7th of May 2008 between Hezbollah and his allies against the Sunni factions85.  
Later that month the regionally sponsored Doha agreement, which re-embraced the 
sectarian power-sharing system of Lebanon, had to be introduced to end the fighting. The 
former commander of the Lebanese army Michel Suleiman was chosen to be the 
succeeding president and a national unity government had to be formed before the next 
parliamentary elections were to take place in the summer of 200986. Lebanon looked as if 
it was on the right track until the post-2009 elections cabinet of Prime Minister Saad Al 
Hariri collapsed on the 12th of January 201187. Once again, members of the March 8 
camp resigned.  
Prime Minister Najib Mikati was next to hold the premiership, putting together an 
executive that left out the representatives of the March 14 bloc88. Internal pressures were 
on the rise now that the situation in Syria was further deteriorating, and members of the 
March 14 coalition constantly blamed the cabinet for the rising domestic instability and 
accused it of being pro-March 8; finally Mikati decided to step down from his position in 
March of 201389. Still, consociational governance did not get any easier in Lebanon. It 
took Prime Minister Tammam Salam 10 months to assemble the next cabinet and no new 
                                                             
85 (Najem, 2012, pp. 80-81) 
86 (Salamey, The Government and Politics of Lebanon, 2014, p. 70) 
87 (Cutler, 2011) 
88 (Salamey, The Government and Politics of Lebanon, 2014, p. 79) 
89 (Cutler, 2011) 
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president has yet been elected since the six years term of President Michel Suleiman 
came to an end in May of 201490. 
If the power-sharing approach was an ideal fit for the multi-sectarian Lebanese 
society and endured well during the early years of independence – prior to 1975 and 
excluding the brief events of 1958-, then where has Lebanon gone wrong on the 
consociational system? In order to answer this question, Arend Lijphart’s four elements 
of consociational democracy must be re-examined, as to determine how they have been 
manipulated by the sectarian division in Lebanon. 
The same qualifications that had facilitated the application of consociational 
democracy in 1943 were no longer completely present after 2005, thus leading to the 
defection of the system later on. To begin with, although discontent towards the Syrian 
presence in the country had greatly intensified by 2005, Syria was not a shared enemy 
among the various Lebanese parties. On one hand, the Bristol camp stressed the need for 
the employment of UN Security Council Resolution 1559 that necessitated the 
withdrawal of foreign troops from Lebanon, and pushed further for their demands 
following the assassination of Prime Minister Rafik Al Hariri and the increased 
allegations against the Syrian regime. On the other hand, the Shiite parties of Amal and 
Hezbollah constantly criticized the 1559 resolution and had later reasserted their support 
for Syria through organizing a mass demonstration in Beirut on March 8 of 200591.  
Members of the latter coalition not only voiced their gratitude to the services of the 
Syrian apparatus while in Lebanon, but also maintained their good connections with the 
                                                             
90 (BBC News, 2015) 
91 (Salamey, The Government and Politics of Lebanon, 2014, pp. 64-67) Prior to the assassination of 
Prime Minister Rafik Al Hariri in February of 2005, the Bristol Camp represented a group of local 
political actors that opposed the continuing presence of the Syrian apparatus in Lebanon. In addition 
to Prime Minister Rafik Al Hariri, the bloc also included the Druze leader Walid Jumblatt as well as 
Christian groups like the Kataib Party for example and the Lebanese Forces.  
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regime, thus making their relations more controversial ever since the civil war began in 
Syria in 2011 and Hezbollah got directly involved in the fighting. 
Adding to that, the lines of cleavage are much deeper now than they ever were 
before. During the 19th century, loyalties in Mount Lebanon shifted from being based on 
social hierarchy to become an extension of the sectarian atmosphere that took over the 
region following the hostilities of 1841 and 1860. At first, individuals living in the area 
offered their loyalty to the zaim- or sheikh-regardless of his sectarian identity, but out of 
respect to his person as the landowner and the link between the region and the higher 
authorities92. Nonetheless, when aggression began to grow between the Druze and the 
Maronites, the sect became the basis upon which loyalties were built. A similar pattern 
aggravated sectarian antagonisms in 2005 and afterwards. Although the country had 
already been divided along sectarian lines, the frequent bombings and assassination 
attempts along with the short-term armed battles like that of May 2008 took disparities to 
a new level.  
The likelihood that the Alawite Syrian regime, an ally of the Shiite parties of 
Lebanon, is directly involved in the assassination of the Sunni Prime Minister Rafik Al 
Hariri increased sectarian tensions93. Besides, the Sunni-Shiite resentment took a new 
dimension when armed men from Hezbollah and Amal occupied the Sunni streets of 
Beirut on the 7th of May 2008. The Muslim population became mindful of its Shiite or 
Sunni identity as the political arena separated into a March 14 and a March 8 camp, and 
associates of the latter bloc became recurrent targets of assassination assaults. 
Consequently, the power of the “zaim” was re-enforced and religious and kinship ties 
                                                             
92 (Hamzeh, Clientalism, Lebanon: Roots and Trends , 2001, pp. 168-169) 
93 (Talhamy, 2009, pp. 561-565) Although Syria has a Sunni majority, the Alawites of the country 
managed to reach power and specifically the presidency in 1971. 
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were granted a bigger role in politics now that feelings of wariness among the Lebanese 
people has grown immensely.  
Furthermore, and in addition to the argument that the value of a grand coalition has 
been weakened earlier in 1989 when the Taif channeled the power of the Maronite 
president to the Sunni premiership and the Shiite speaker of the parliament, the rising 
domestic tensions made it harder to work in a grand coalition now that the local politics 
reflected a “government-versus-opposition” reality94. The partition into this governmental 
structure was provoked by the various incidents occurring internally, whether it was the 
dilemma around the Syrian presence in Lebanon, the issue of the Special Tribunal for 
Lebanon and the investigating committee, the war of 2006 between Hezbollah and Israel, 
or even the most recent civil war in Syria.  
In 2006 and 2011the March 8 opposition walked out on the governments of Prime 
Minister Fouad Siniora and Prime Minister Saad Al Hariri respectively depriving them of 
their legitimacies, and in 2011 the principle of grand coalition was totally ignored on the 
executive level when members of the March 14 camp did not take part in Prime Minister 
Najib Mikati’s cabinet. The absence of major groups from a governmental arrangement 
and the empowerment of the opposition in other governmental designs, as in the case of 
the 16-11-3 national unity formula of the Doha agreement in 2008, are both measures that 
undermine the standard of mutual veto95. Under the national unity plan, the largest 
number of ministerial seats was given to the March 14 bloc whose members filled the 
majority in the parliament, members of the March 8 camp were given 11 seats and the 
                                                             
94 (Lijphart, Consociational Democracy , 1977, p. 25) According to Lijphart, in a consociational 
democracy a grand coalition government is often established to include representatives of the 
various constituents of the country; unlike other democracies where the majority takes over the 
government while its power is challenged by an opposition.   
95 (United Nations Security Council , Security Council Report, 2008, p. 2) 
 37 
president- a neutral- had 396. This formula created what came to be known as the 
“blocking-third” or “al thulth al mu’attel”, thus generating the ability to obstruct the 
work of the cabinet upon disapproval from a third of the members. As a result, even 
though the opposition represents the minority in the government, its members can still 
prevent a certain decision from being adopted or even bring down the government by 
forming a coalition that adds up to a one third of the total number of ministers in the 
cabinet. In 2009, when the same formula was employed in the cabinet led by Prime 
Minister Saad Al Hariri and as the disagreement over the international tribunal increased, 
the opposition and the neutrals resigned bringing down the government thus creating 
deadlock in the decision making process for the second time97.  
As for proportionality in the parliament, the equal ratio of 5:5 between the Christians 
and the Muslims and the distribution of seats depending on the size of each sect have not 
considered the demographic changes that have taken place. Not only there was no other 
census other than that conducted in 1932, but also there is no chance given to non-
sectarian parties or independent individuals to run in parliamentary elections. In the last 
elections that were held in 2009, the electoral law was based on that of 1960. 
Subsequently, Lebanon was divided into small regions known as the “Qada”. Depending 
on the population size, each Qada is designated a number of seats, which in turn are 
divided proportionally among the sects available within that Qada98. Parties then form 
coalitions and present their candidates in every region in a list that voters can either drop 
in the ballot box without making any changes, or can cross out names or add names of 
candidates that belong to other lists99. The majority in the parliament would then be the 
                                                             
96 (United Nations Security Council , Security Council Report, 2008, p. 2) 
97 (Salamey, The Government and Politics of Lebanon, 2014, pp. 78-79) 
98 (Salamey, The Government and Politics of Lebanon, 2014, pp. 111-116) 
99 (Salamey, The Government and Politics of Lebanon, 2014, pp. 111-116) 
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bloc with the highest sum of seats won in all the districts, 128 being the total number of 
seats, and would have the right to propose a name as the Prime Minister100.  
Even though a whole new group has emerged in civil society to call for the total 
abandonment of the power-sharing system and its replacement with a secular system, the 
majoritarian bloc vote has not been altered causing deeper sectarian division and giving 
more power to the “zaim”. This voting system along with the sharper lines of division 
and the element of autonomy that is required in a consociational democracy, all have 
made the elites stronger than the law and the state and turned political parties into forums 
delivering public services to their followers.  
 
Political Fragmentation and Fundamentalist Motivation 
In “Rebuilding Weak States” the authors Eizenstat, Porter and Weinstein identify 
three “capability gaps” that weak states often suffer from, the “capacity gap”, the 
“legitimacy gap” and the “security gap”101. While the first gap emphasizes the basic 
needs for the people, the legitimacy gap tackles the role that the rights of the people have 
in legitimizing a government, and the security gap is concerned with the importance of 
maintaining security by the state in order to prevent unlawful acts102. One way of 
explaining the relationship between the weak state institutions -that are the result of the 
sect-based consociational system- and the rise of Jihadi Salafism in the country is 
actually through applying these three “capability gaps” to the case of Lebanon.  
 Beginning with the “capacity gap”, according to the same authors “ a government 
must also provide basic services such as education and health care to its citizens. An 
                                                             
100 (Salamey, The Government and Politics of Lebanon, 2014, p. 144) 
101 (Eizenstat , Porter , & Weinstein , 2005, pp. 136-139) 
102 (Eizenstat , Porter , & Weinstein , 2005, pp. 136-139) 
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inability to do so creates a “capacity gap”, which can lead to a loss of public confidence 
and then perhaps political upheaval”103. In the case of Lebanon, the incapability of the 
state to provide the people with their basic needs and the exploitation of political power 
affects all the communities, resulting in feelings of marginalization and in some cases 
radicalism.    
Since Lebanon operates under a consociational political system, all governmental 
and upper civil service posts are appointed based on the power-sharing formula. Hence, 
almost every sect acquires a share of positions, whether in the parliament, the cabinet, the 
army or any other entity, that is proportional to the 5:5 ratio presented by the Taif in 
1989. The country’s system is also dominated by a certain number of parties that 
represent the major sects in all political issues. Each of the parties is headed by one of the 
popular leaders, many of which have inherited their positions from a family member or 
had been militia leaders during the civil war, and whose capabilities – along with those of 
the party- have surpassed those of the state through taking advantage of what the power-
sharing system has offered them104. The incompatibility of powers between the political 
parties and political elites and the state weakened the state institutions and opened up one 
gateway through which the Islamist fundamentalist ideology could enter the country.  
Every party is given a significant degree of autonomy in districts where large 
numbers of their supporters reside. In these areas, parties develop vast networks of social 
                                                             
103 (Eizenstat , Porter , & Weinstein , 2005, p. 136) 
104 Several of the political parties in Lebanon are headed by individuals who have inherited their 
positions by family lines, have been militia leaders during the civil war of 1975 in Lebanon or even 
both. The Kataeb party for example was founded by Pierre Gemayel; its leadership then moved to 
his son Bachir Gemayel who served as president for a short time during the civil war before his 
brother Amin Gemayel succeeded him after his assassination, and afterwards the latter’s son Sami 
Gemayel. The leadership of the Progressive Socialist Party was also passed from its founder Kamal 
Jumblatt to his son Walid Jumblatt. Both the Kataeb party and the Progressive Socialist Party, as well 
as the Amal Movment led by the Speaker of Parliament Nabih Berri and the Lebanese Forces headed 
by Samir Gaegae had been active in the fighting during the civil war. The leaders of these groups, 
among others, are still primary actors and members of the sect-based consociational system of 
Lebanon.   
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services to deliver to the people. Hezbollah for example builds schools, hospitals and 
clinics in the Shiite-dominated southern suburbs of Beirut, south region, the Nabatieh 
district and even in the Bekaa. As for Christian parties like The Free Patriotic Movement 
of General Michel Aoun, the Kataeb or the Lebanese Forces, they are primarily 
concerned with Christian regions like the Matn, Keserwan or even Bcharre in the north. 
The Druze parties like the Progressive Socialist Party of Walid Jumblatt, for instance, 
mainly work in the Chouf and Aley regions, and the Future Movement focuses on areas 
like Beirut, Tripoli, Sidon, Akkar and Al Dinniyeh with Sunni majorities. Also, the 
parties have their own websites, online newspapers, as well as social media accounts as 
Twitter and Facebook as media platforms and direct connections with their supporters105.  
Taking hospitalization as a case to look at, and according to the statistics of 2012, out 
of 166 hospitals contracting with the Ministry of Public Health in Lebanon, only 25 are 
public while the rest – 141 hospitals- are private106. Yet, not all the parties have equal 
amounts of resources and the kind of projects that the parties can fund and the number of 
individuals they can provide to often vary from one party to the other. Actually, 
Hezbollah and the Future Movement are considered the wealthiest among the support 
groups; therefore, they are probably the most active in the domain of social services107. 
For instance, while the former manages the Islamic Health Unit and has 24 clinics and 
four hospitals, the latter runs more than 40 clinics under the Health Directory of the 
Hariri Foundation108.  
                                                             
105 For example, Hezbollah has the Al Manar channel, the Free Patriotic Movement has the Otv, and 
the Future channel belongs to the Future Movement. Even some newspapers are divided among the 
political blocs, either as direct media investments or simply as political supporters of one of the 
groups. The Al Mustaqbal for instance is considered pro-March 14 while Assafir or Al Akhbar are pro-
March 8. 
106 (Statistics Department, 2013) 
107 (Cammett & Issar , 2010, p. 391) 
108 (Cammett & Issar , 2010, pp. 400-402) Hezbollah and the Hariri Foundation also control 
educational facilities and charity associations.  
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This form of interaction between the political representatives and the public is known 
as clientalism, which took the form of “governmental patronage” ever since the 
consociational system was introduced in 1943109. In return for these local services, the 
parties gain the people’s loyalty, which is directly related to the second point, elections 
and proportional representation in the parliament. Since the electoral law divides the 128 
parliamentary seats in accordance with the sectarian identities in the country, political 
parties utilize their potentials in collecting votes from their sectarian affiliates to ensure 
their admission – and re-election- into the parliament. Once elected, parties will have a 
better access to state institution and hence will increase their ability to provide a wider 
range of services to their constituents; and the cycle goes on110.  
Moreover, parties are known to uplift their service providing activities during 
elections season. Even individuals who are not of the same sect or are not close 
supporters of the party become direct targets of political campaigns if their votes can tilt 
the final results of the ballot boxes, especially in mixed districts where electoral 
competition is intense111. Vote buying, covering transportation fees, roads maintenance, 
and even supplying meals are all mechanisms that political parties employ during 
elections in the hope of increasing their chances of winning.  
Also, since proportionality reaches beyond the parliament and includes the civil 
service occupations, and because the principle of grand coalition emphasizes the 
participation of all the major factions of the society clientalism is not limited to the 
legislative branch. Consequently, a third point to tackle is the fact that ministerial seats 
and public administrative appointments are also used as a source of power accumulation 
                                                             
109 (Hamzeh, Clientalism, Lebanon: Roots and Trends , 2001, p. 171) Earlier in Mount Lebanon, 
clientalism had feudal characters, whereby security was exchanged for loyalty to the zaim or the 
landowner.  
110 (Hamzeh, Clientalism, Lebanon: Roots and Trends , 2001, p. 172) 
111 (Cammett & Issar , 2010, pp. 386-387) 
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by many of those who either fill those positions or have the right to assign individuals to 
the job. When in office, ministers tend at many times to give privileges to those 
belonging to their sect, to followers of their parties or supporters of the larger political 
alliances to which they belong. A citizen who has connections with members of the 
political apparatus in Lebanon is known to have what is called “wasta”. This status makes 
it easier for its holder to receive the kind of services – especially those related to the 
ministry held by the individual’s support group- that the state must be delivering equally 
to all its nationals based on meritocracy and under the regulation of laws. Citizens also 
use their “wasta” to evade from the law and avoid or commute prosecutions.   
Nevertheless, clientalism is negatively affecting the state in two ways. First, the 
person of the representative along with the party and the sect, have overshadowed the 
importance and the role of the governmental institutions. In order to obtain a basic right 
or to complete a public obligation, a Lebanese citizen most often relies upon what the 
zaim, the party or his connections could deliver rather than what the state institutions can 
offer or what the state laws articulate. Consequently, as the significance of belonging to a 
sect and identifying with a certain sectarian identity increases, the line that divides the 
country’s subcultures will grow wider and the power of state institutions will weaken.  
Second, due to the fact that a large portion of the state services are not being equally 
channeled to all the Lebanese citizens, the state is constantly accused of bias; which 
ultimately could lead to a radical reaction from the people’s side. On one hand, the 
Lebanese political system is already under economic and social pressure and thus cannot 
perform in utter strength or deliver very generously to the people. After all, Lebanon’s 
internal stability can be directly affected by any regional turmoil or change in the balance 
of power – or even by international variations. On the other hand, the sect-based 
consociational system -which has also increased the pressure on the system by creating 
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deadlock and lack of cooperation on several occasions- has empowered the sect and 
eventually the party and the zaim, who have manipulated the system to their advantage. 
Some elites may try to be fair in their representations, but in several other instances 
political leaders either choose to prioritize their followers or to pay less attention to the 
needs of the people – whether supporters or not- once the elections period is over112.  
Nonetheless, the end result is the growth of dissatisfaction towards the performance 
of the state. The shift of power in the parliament along with the exploitation of the grand 
coalition rule leaves some sects feeling misrepresented. Adding to that, the unequal 
distribution of state services and the monopolization of certain sectors, especially those 
related to the economy, by elites, families, parties or sects also produce a feeling of 
marginalization among the groups. Furthermore, due to the amount of emphasis on 
political power, economic and social matters often become secondary issues to parties 
and political representatives. Ultimately, the result is what the authors of “Rebuilding 
Weak States” called “loss of public confidence” which increases the chances of a 
“political upheaval”113. In Lebanon, dissatisfaction with the system due to the “capacity 
gap” is in certain cases reflected through the rise of religious extremism as an alternative 
to the deficient system of the state. People living in the underprivileged regions like some 
parts of the North, the South or the Bekaa for example, where poor economic conditions 
and social underdevelopment are concentrated, are often the most affected. While some 
individuals decide to speak up against the political system, others give in to the sectarian 
                                                             
112 (Cammett & Issar , 2010, pp. 411-415) . In the Ouzai region, the Hariri party has somehow 
neglected supporters of the Future Movement once the elections were over, and Hezbollah only 
expanded their services to reach the Shiites of Jbeil starting in 2005 for electoral reasons especially 
at a time when domestic politics were changing. In 2006 Hezbollah allied with the Free Patriotic 
Movement of Michel Aoun and so it had to help the party collect more votes, especially that the new 
electoral law gave more prominence to the Shiite population in Jbeil.   
113 (Eizenstat , Porter , & Weinstein , 2005, p. 136) 
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political parties earning their own “wasta” and others begin to relate to the ideologies of 
Islamist extremism. 
Statistics provided by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) in 2008 in 
collaboration with the Ministry of Social affairs in Lebanon show that until 2004, 28.6% 
of the Lebanese people lived on an income that is less than $4 a day. In terms of 
acquiring the “basic needs” of a household, in the North 38% of the citizens were 
considered deprived and 9% extremely deprived, in the South 40% were deprived and 4% 
extremely deprived, in the Bekaa 29% were found to be deprived and 4% extremely 
deprived while 42% of the people in the Nabatieh classified as deprived and 5% as 
extremely deprived114. 
At least three of those districts have experienced some form of Islamic 
fundamentalism at a certain point, even prior to the major changes in the politics of 
Lebanon that began to take place in 2005. Taking the North for example, Tripoli and the 
mountainous Al Dinniyeh both were areas were Islamist extremist groups like Harakat al 
Tawheed al Islami (Islamic Unity Movement) and Majmouat al Dinniyeh (Dinniyeh 
Group) respectively emerged. The former reached the peak of their influence in 1984-
1985 when their radical beliefs were transformed into actual regulations in Tripoli by 
“imposing a very strict code of conduct, and forcing non-Muslim residents out of the 
city”115. As for the latter group, its members led a fighting against the Lebanese Army in 
                                                             
114 (Abla, 2014, pp. 22-24) 
(Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2010, pp. 16-18) The basic needs term refers to the 
availability or absence of essential elements within a society like “food, clothing, housing, education 
and public transportation”. It may also include issues like healthcare, employment or being part of 
the decision making process.  
115 (Abdel-Latif, 2008, p. 6) Harakat al Tawheed Al Islami was established by Sheikh Said Shaaban, 
The success of the movement in implementing an extremist Islamist ideology in Tripoli was short 
lived as it fell apart following the clashes with the Syrian army in 1985. 
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Al Dinniyeh in 1999116. Significant numbers of the community in Tripoli and Al 
Dinniyeh are still amongst the poorest in the country. Data collected by the United 
Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA) in 2011 indicates 
that 32% of the families in Tripoli categorize as deprived and 28% as extremely 
deprived117. Another study showed that the degree of poverty in the Akkar/ Minieh – Al 
Dinniyeh area reached 60% by the year 2004118. 
In the Bekaa, Majdal Anjar also witnessed the development of a radical Islamist 
ideology among some members of its community, and so did Sidon in the South. For 
example, Islamic fundamentalism in Majdal Anjar can be traced back to 1986, but the 
phenomenon came to the forefront when five men from that same region were killed in 
Iraq fighting against the US troops there119.  
Moreover, when talking about the legitimacy gap, the authors in “Rebuilding Weak 
States” explain that in order “to foster its legitimacy a government needs to protect the 
basic rights and freedoms of its people, enforce the rule of law, and allow broad-based 
participation in the political process”120. Since a significant number of the Sunni 
community does not believe that the political system in Lebanon is capable of protecting 
their rights or even bringing them justice, it is not uncommon for those groups to refuse 
to submit to the Lebanese government as their legitimate representative. Therefore, in an 
attempt to feel secure some members of the Sunni community would seek an alternative 
form of protection, one that they believe is found in religion, and that could either be 
                                                             
116 (Saab & Ranstorp, 2007, pp. 832-833) Majmouat Al Dinniyeh was assembled by a jihadist who had 
taken part alongside other Islamist fundamentalists against the Soviets in Afghanistan.  
117 (Abla, 2014, p. 25) 
118 (United Nations Development Program, 2008, p. 20) 
119 (Saab & Ranstorp, 2007, pp. 834-835) 
120 (Eizenstat , Porter , & Weinstein , 2005, p. 136) 
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implemented by entering the political process as in the case of activist Islamists or 
through the use of force as in the case of Salafi Jiadist groups121.  
For instance, some members of the Sunni sect in Lebanon believe that the Sunni 
community specifically lacks a proper representation by its Sunni political and religious 
leaders, whether it was the former Prime Ministers Saad Al Hariri or Najib Mikati or 
Fouad Siniora, or others who are members of the cabinet, representatives in the 
parliament or clerics. The absence of the right representation, as described by one party 
of the Association of Muslim Scholars in Lebanon (Hay’at al-Ulama al-Muslimin fi 
Lubnan), does not necessarily mean “numbers”, but refers to the representatives’ 
“influence in governance”, which in the case of the Sunnis in Lebanon was further 
affected by the governmental formula introduced by the Doha Agreement, and thus is 
reflected through underdevelopment, unemployment and poverty in Sunni dominated 
regions likes Tripoli, Akkar and Bekaa122. Although the Sunni community in Lebanon 
had been skeptic about sharing power with the other sects since Greater Lebanon was 
formed in 1920, the outcomes have been more serious as the sectarian division deepened 
and the Sunni-Shiite antagonism increased since 2005123.  
In addition, the legitimacy gap between the Sunni community in Lebanon and the 
official authorities has increased due to the weakened roles of the religious institutions 
that represent these groups, Dar Al Fatwa in particular124. Every sect in Lebanon is 
represented by a higher religious organization recognized by the state. However, due to 
                                                             
121 (International Crisis Group, Understanding Islamism, 2005) 
122 (Sheikh Salem Al Rafei, 2014) 
123 The Sunni community in Lebanon became a part of the country when Greater Lebanon was 
formed under the French mandate in 1920. However, members of the Sunni community were for a 
long time interested in being part of the greater Arab world, rather than Lebanon, especially that 
they shared with the rest of the Arab world the same history and religious background.  
124 (Lefèvre, Lebanon's Dar al-Fatwa and The Search for Moderation, 2015) Dar Al Fatwa in Lebanon 
is the official religious institution that represents the Sunni community of the country and is headed 
by an elected Sunni Mufti. The institution is responsible for settling debates over religious matters as 
well as overlooking the welfare of the Sunni community in Lebanon.  
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the sect-based consociational system the roles of these institutions intertwine in many 
occasions with the politics and sectarian divisions of the country125. Religious figures 
either ally themselves with a particular political party thus empowering political 
sectarianism and contributing to the sectarian division in the society, or are 
overshadowed by political “zaims” through power and material resources. Eventually, 
the outcome is the same. Members of the sect turn to other non-credible sources for both 
religious and social protection. In the case of the Muslims of Lebanon, and particularly 
members of the Sunni community, individuals are finding the security that they need 
among extremist religious representatives. Radical Islamists offer a substitute to those 
affected by the state triggered economic, social and political marginalization; thus, 
making the deprived believe even more that the employed political systems are corrupt 
and that the economic, social or even political inequalities that the people are living under 
are the result of the absence of the Islamic law from the systems of governance.  
Finally, the presence of a “security gap” in Lebanon is another factor that encourages 
not only the growth but also the survival of Salafi Jihadi groups in the country. According 
to the authors of “Rebuilding Weak States”, “A state’s most basic task is to provide 
security by maintaining a monopoly on the use of force, protecting against internal and 
external threats, and preserving sovereignty over territory.”126. Otherwise, “rebellious 
armed groups or criminal non-state actors may use violence to exploit this security 
gap”127. In the case of Lebanon, the “security gap” is the result of two interconnected 
factors; the distrust that exists between the official authorities and the people and the 
limited ability of the official authorities to act at all times.   
                                                             
125 (Abdel-Latif, 2008, p. 21) 
126 (Eizenstat , Porter , & Weinstein , 2005, p. 136) 
127 (Eizenstat , Porter , & Weinstein , 2005, p. 136) 
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Of course, the internal security institutions of Lebanon try to maintain sectarian and 
political neutrality in order to serve equally among the citizens. However, the 
consociational political system and the sectarian division threaten and cast doubt on the 
impartiality of these institutions. First, due to the sect-based distribution of power the 
highest position of every security apparatus in Lebanon is also specific to one of the 
major sects – Maronites, Sunnis and Shiites-, and thus it is not uncommon to accuse a 
security establishment of bias to one sect or even the party that represents that sect. One 
example is the animosity that grew during the civil war of 1975 between the Sunnis of 
Lebanon and the Lebanese Armed Forces. The chief of the Lebanese Armed Forces had 
always been a Maronite, and therefore the clashes that broke between the Lebanese army 
on one side and the Palestinian armed groups on the other caused denunciations against 
the army, which was then considered biased towards the Maronites and against the 
Sunnis of the country. 
Similar suspicion towards the performance of the Lebanese Armed Forces still exists, 
especially from the side of the extremist Sunni groups in Lebanon. In fact, according to 
the Salafi Jihadi groups the army is not only unfair towards the Sunnis of the country but 
it is a religious duty to wage an armed confrontation against the institution. For instance, 
in December of 1999 a group known as Majmouat al Dinniyeh began an attack against 
the army in the North region of al-Dinniyeh that lasted for six days128. Even though the 
duration of the clashes was short, the Jihadi group revealed the extremist ideology that 
exists among a significant number of the citizens in the region and the possible intentions 
of implementing a religious rule in the country or Northern region at the least129. Another 
example occurred in May of 2007 when a Salafi Jihadist group known as Fath al-Islam in 
                                                             
128 (Saab & Ranstorp, 2007, p. 833) 
129 (Saab & Ranstorp, 2007, pp. 823-833) 
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the Palestinian camp of Nahr al-Bared fought against the Lebanese army130. The conflict 
began when members of the Jihadi groups killed soldiers from the Lebanese Army 
following a bank theft, and although the group was non-Lebanese, the opposition against 
the Lebanese Armed Forces reflects the resentment that exists towards the security 
institution131.  
Second, the distrust that exists towards the security authorities in Lebanon is not only 
a result of the sectarian representation in these institutions but also a product of the 
limitations that the consociational political system instigates on the ability of the security 
institutions to act during critical situations in the country. In order to maintain some 
degree of neutrality, the security institutions maintain a high level of caution when two 
sects or political parties and blocs become involved in any form of clash, whether armed 
or peaceful in the form of demonstrations or other protesting mechanisms. In fact, the 
security authorities may choose not to interfere at all in order not to risk being accused of 
bias. However, this latter form of reaction often leads to two results; either 
disappointment from one party amid feelings of being marginalized by the authorities or 
the general notion that the security forces in Lebanon are incapable of fulfilling their 
responsibility of providing security and protection for the people. In both cases the 
outcome is one; distrust towards the security system of the country and the urge to 
develop a system of self-protection sometimes using religion as a background and 
particularly Jihadism.  
One example that illustrates the case of the “security gap” in Lebanon and its 
relationship with the rise of Salafi Jihadism in the country is the dilemma around the 
                                                             
130 (International Crisis Group, Lebanon's Palestinian Dilemma: The Struggle Over Nahr Al-Bared, 
2012, pp. 1-2) 
131 (International Crisis Group, Lebanon's Palestinian Dilemma: The Struggle Over Nahr Al-Bared, 
2012) 
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arms of Hezbollah. Initially, Hezbollah was officially established in 1985 after its Shiite 
members had began their first resistance activity against Israel in 1982 following the 
latter’s invasion of Beirut132. After the civil war came to an end in 1989, Hezbollah 
continued its role as a Lebanese resistance movement challenging the Israeli occupation 
and became part of the political system in Lebanon in 1992 after taking part in the 
parliamentary elections for the first time that same year. The party won its first 
parliamentary seats and continued to take part in the political process in Lebanon through 
the legislative branch until its members finally entered the cabinet after 2005133.  
Although the Taif necessitated the disarmament of all militias in Lebanon, 
Hezbollah’s arms – or what is known as the Lebanese Islamic Resistance- were excluded 
from the decision given the “resistance” position that the armed branch of Hezbollah held 
– and still holds- in its battle against the Israeli occupation of Southern territories in 
Lebanon. Nonetheless, after the liberation of 2000, tolerance towards the arms of 
Hezbollah decreased. While a significant group of political actors consider that the 
liberation responsibility of the resistance movement ended with the Israeli withdrawal in 
2000 and thus the arms of Hezbollah are irrelevant, Hezbollah believes that the liberation 
will be complete upon the retrieval of the Shebaa farms134.  
                                                             
132 (Qassem, 2005, pp. 87-98) 
133 (Fadlallah D. , 2014) Hezbollah chose not to “participate in an installed rule” but rather to 
“depend on popular elections” as a means to become part of the political system in Lebanon. As a 
result, the first parliamentary participation of Hezbollah was in 1992 after the war had brought the 
parliamentary elections to a halt for more than 10 years. Later, after 2005 Hezbollah had to let go of 
its role as a “permanent opposition” to the executive authority. After the Syrian withdrawal in 2005, 
Hezbollah entered the cabinet due to “ the Resistance’s need to be a direct partner in the power 
since the Syrian presence at the time was at least a safeguard at the strategic level, a cover for the 
work of the Resistance”, but now Hezbollah had to protect the Resistance from any executive 
decision that could negatively affect the presence and continuity of the Lebanese Islamic Resistance 
in Lebanon.   
134 Although Hezbollah considers the liberation of the Shebaa farms a part of its resistance 
responsibility against Israeli occupation of territories in Lebanon, there is an ongoing dispute over 
whether the Shebaa farms belong to Lebanon or are part of Syria.  
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Therefore, the first element to the security gap is the presence of an active non-
governmental armed force within Lebanon with an agenda and a structure that does not 
answer to the state. One, Hezbollah’s resistance movement and its fight against the Israeli 
occupation of land in Lebanon reflects an inability of the state, particularly the incapacity 
of Lebanon’s security forces, to protect the country against foreign threat. In fact, one 
way that Hezbollah justifies its possession of weapons is by pointing out the threat that 
the Israeli presence in the region confers on the Arab world as a whole, the absence of an 
adequate response on behalf of the Arab countries towards the occupation and the lack of 
sufficient “defense capabilities” by the state in Lebanon135. Two, Hezbollah’s armed 
branch provides precedence to self-protection and even extremist armed groups. 
Regardless of the status of Hezbollah – whether considered a political Islamist party or an 
extremist Jihadi group-, the reaction to its role in Lebanon and the region particularly the 
rise of rival Sunni Jihadi groups is a second element to the security gap in Lebanon.  
On one hand, the lack of trust in the Sunni official representation and the feelings of 
insecurity due to beliefs in the weakness of the state pushed members of the Sunni 
community to seek methods of self-protection. Although some might choose to use their 
“wasta” with powerful political actors in the country as a safeguard, others take arms as a 
source of security. Since the state’s laws have already been breached by the presence of a 
fully operating Lebanese Islamic Resistance, adopting a similar behavior – even though 
with much smaller boundaries- is to many Lebanese citizens justifiable. On the other 
hand, the fears that exist over a change in the sectarian balance of power in Lebanon and 
particularly the deepening sectarian division especially among the Sunnis and the Shiites 
of the country and the region, is another reason why members of the Sunni subculture 
may resort to arms and extremist religious beliefs. After all, Hezbollah is a Shiite party 
                                                             
135 (Fadlallah D. , 2014) 
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that represents an ideology that is extracted from the Iranian Revolution and is also 
protected and supported as a party by Iran. Moreover, even though Hezbollah was once 
supported in its fight against the Israeli occupation by citizens from the various sects in 
Lebanon, suspicion towards the role of the party increased after the events of May 7 in 
2008. By turning its arms inwards, and particularly against supporters of the Sunni Future 
Movement, Hezbollah lost a significant amount of support from the Sunni sect and 
became a target of Sunni Salafi Jihadi opposition, whereby one of their main goals is to 
empower the Sunni sect against the rise of any other subgroup. In addition, this form of 
hostility between the Sunni sect and the Shiites, as well as the distrust that exists between 
a significant number of the Sunni sect and the army will only persist and further develop 
as the sectarian division in the country deepens, feelings of marginalization grow and 
political representatives encourage this division through the sectarian speeches that they 
use to preserve their shares of power.  
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Chapter 2 
A Weak State and Fundamentalist Impulses 
 
 
Before Lebanon was expanded to take its current area it was restricted to what 
was known as Mount Lebanon, a home for the Druze and the Maronites under the direct 
rule of a local Emir and the supervision of the Ottoman authorities. In 1842, the system of 
the double Qaimmaqamiya came into effect whereby one was headed by a Druze and the 
other by a Maronite, and in 1861 Mount Lebanon became an autonomous Mutasarrifiya 
directed by a Christian but non-Lebanese Mutasarrif136. It was after the construction of 
Greater Lebanon in 1920 that the current Lebanese identity became relevant to citizens 
living within the 10,452 km2 area, and the identity only became official when 
independence was recognized in 1943. Yet, even after the independence of the country 
was recognized Lebanese nationals still felt the need to identify themselves with their 
sect-based subcultures, and in some occasions with other nation-states in the region. The 
reason why the people had the urge to look beyond the Lebanese borders is actually 
twofold.  
On one hand, this connection to the outside springs out of Lebanon’s historical 
formation. The citizens that became Lebanese nationals after the changes of 1920 initially 
belonged to distinct territories in the region, either sharing a common identity with the 
rest of the Arab region- particularly the Arabian peninsula- and seeking to operate under 
                                                             
136 (Makdisi, The Culture of Sectarianism: Community, History, and Violence in Nineteenth-Century 
Ottoman Lebanon, 2000, p. 159) 
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the same system of governance, or lacking a sense of belonging to the larger Arab world. 
The Sunnis for instance aspired to attain their pre-1920 unification plans for a long time, 
and the Maronites worried about being dominated by the Muslim current of the Arab 
world. On the other hand, the distrust that grew between the local entities pushed 
members of every community to form closer relations with regional or international 
actors, and their sense of fear was further highlighted by the already existing rivalries in 
the region– whether it was the Sunni-Shiite tensions or the Palestinian issue. 
As a result, the question to ask here is; how can the sectarian division in Lebanon 
weaken the country as a regional actor and how do sect-based regional affiliations 
facilitate the rise of Salafi Jihadism within the country? The chapter will begin by 
showing the origins of the sectarian affiliations in Lebanon and identifying the 
connection patterns that exist between the various sects in Lebanon and other actors in 
the region. The chapter will then move to explain how these affiliations link the internal 
politics of Lebanon directly to the political events and changes in the region. By pointing 
out the role of the sectarian identity in connecting the sects of Lebanon to the outside and 
in transferring the conflicts of the region to the inside of the country, the chapter will 
show the relationship that exists between an imperfect national identity that is 
overshadowed by the sectarian identity, the weak position of Lebanon as a state in the 
region and the rise of Salafi Jihadism within the country.  
 
Identities Across Borders 
Upon the downfall of the Ottoman Empire following World War I and the 
take over of the British and the French in the Arab region, the Maronites were to a 
certain extent, and until the early years of post-independence, comfortable with the 
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enlargement of the Lebanese territories137. First, some of the added lands included 
cities like Beirut, Tripoli or Sidon, that lay at the coast of the Mediterranean sea, 
providing to the Maronites of Mount Lebanon a better access to surrounding 
countries and continents. Hence, those areas along with the valleys of the Bekaa and 
Akkar were considered major sources of economic benefits that Lebanon could now 
use to prosper138. Second, the Maronites were confident about maintaining power, as 
they constituted the largest sect – but not an absolute majority- in the newly founded 
Lebanon139. In 1932, out of a total of 793,396 Lebanese citizens, the Maronites made 
up a total of 227,800 when the closest to them, the Sunnis, were 178,100140.  
Third, the Maronites had developed a good connection with the west, and 
particularly the French, that dated back to Mount Lebanon. The Europeans saw the 
Christians of Mount Lebanon as a starting point of resistance against the Ottoman 
Empire in the Middle East, and in turn the Maronites resorted to the French for 
support during the clashes with the Druze in 1860141. Therefore, a link was formed 
between the Christians and the West, which later became a source of power for the 
Maronites under Greater Lebanon and lasted beyond the French mandate until 
present day Lebanon. The West became an external ally that the Christians of 
Lebanon, and especially the Maronites, turned to whenever they felt that their role in 
Lebanon’s political system might be at risk due to an unwanted shift in the sectarian 
balance of power in the country.  
                                                             
137 The feelings of concern due to holding a minority status in the Sunni dominated Arab world did 
exist after 1920 and 1943, but they greatly escalated later on with the influx of large numbers of 
Sunni Palestinian refugees following the 1948 Al Nakba in Palestine and the consequent fears that a 
naturalization decision would alter the internal balance of power between the Lebanese sects.   
138 (Salibi K. S., The Lebanese Identity, 1971, pp. 78-79) 
139 (Hirst, 2010, pp. 8-13) 
140 (Maktabi, 1999, p. 235) 
141 (Makdisi, The Culture of Sectarianism: Community, History, and Violence in Nineteenth-Century 
Ottoman Lebanon, 2000, pp. 15-26) 
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One example that could depict this relationship is Operation Blue Bat, when 
troops from the United States entered Lebanon for a few months in 1958 after the 
Muslims of the country as well as the Druze began to protest against President 
Camille Chamoun’s pro-Western inclinations. When Egypt was in confrontation with 
France, Britain and Israel in 1956 over the Suez Canal following its nationalization 
by President Gamal Abdel Nasser, President Chamoun did not take a clear stand in 
support of Egypt but rather seemed to be inclined towards the West. Yet, the 
president’s position was not what the pan-Arabs of the country had been expecting as 
they voiced their alliance with Egypt and took the streets to express their 
dissatisfaction with their country’s position142. Two years later in 1958, as President 
Chamoun signaled his desire to extend his term as it was coming to an end, sectarian 
clashes broke out in the country and the US involvement was needed to secure the 
President’s remaining time in power143. Actually, the unification of Egypt and Syria 
under the United Arab Republic that same year aggravated the feelings of threat 
among the Maronites and specifically towards their role in the domestic politics of 
Lebanon144.  
Unlike the Maronites of Mount Lebanon, the Sunnis were less interested in 
the annexation of their formerly Ottoman ruled districts to the new Lebanon. One, 
the Sunni- Ottoman relations were far more better than the Maronite-Ottoman 
relations. After all, while the Sunnis and the Ottomans shared the same religious 
                                                             
142 (Salibi K. S., Cross Roads to Civil War: Lebanon 1958-1976, 1976, pp. 1-3) 
143 (Salibi K. S., Cross Roads to Civil War: Lebanon 1958-1976, 1976, pp. 1-3) 
144  Egypt and Syria are two major actors in the politics of the region with a Muslim majority. The 
unification of the two regional powers in 1958 raised fears among the Christians that the expansion 
would increase to include other Arab countries, including Lebanon, which would then diminish their 
power, as they become a minority in a larger Arab entity. Even though the Christians are already a 
small subgroup in the region, they hold a significant position in the internal balance of power in 
Lebanon. Therefore, an inclusion of Lebanon into a larger Arab state would further decrease the 
percentage of the Christians in proportion to the numbers of the other sects and thus they would 
risk losing any amount of power that they have within Lebanon.  
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backgrounds, the Christians along with members of other religions were regarded as 
“dhimmis” who had to abide to stricter rules145. For the Sunnis, therefore, it was 
easier to cope with the Islamic-inspired rule of the Ottomans that made them a 
privileged sect. Two, the Sunnis had reservations about the Maronites holding the 
upper power in the system. As one author puts it, “For the orthodox, largely city-
dwelling Sunnis, members of the Arab nation’s largest religious community and its 
traditional ruling class, the prospect of subordination by local Christians was if 
anything worse than European colonialism; an ‘almost unimaginable inversion of the 
natural order in their world’”146. Three, the Sunnis had been seeking for a long time 
to achieve unification in the Arab world, a goal that they felt closer to once the 
Ottoman rule came to an end. In fact, Sherif Hussein made the first step when he 
managed to take over Damascus in 1918 as part of the “Arab Kingdom”147. 
Nonetheless, little was attained as the French and the British spread their influence 
over the Arab region as per the Sykes-Picot agreement148. Belonging to the dominant 
Sunni sect in the region, holding the same Arab identity, sharing a common history 
and speaking the same language were the basis upon which the unification 
aspirations were built in the Arab region, and the same factors that made the Sunnis 
of Lebanon feel directly linked to the Sunni ruled countries of the region, especially 
the more powerful actors like Saudi Arabia for example.  
As for the Shiites in Lebanon, they were among the smaller and poorer 
communities of the country, whose role in internal politics only began to grow later 
                                                             
145 (Hirst, 2010, pp. 9-10) “Dhimmi” was a term used to refer to non-Muslim inhabitants of the 
Muslim dominated regions of the Arab World. “Dhimmis” were mainly Christians and Jews, whereby 
members of the two religions were treated differently especially when it came to taxation and 
political matters.   
146 (Hirst, 2010, p. 11) 
147 (Hirst, 2010, pp. 6-7) 
148 (Hirst, 2010, pp. 6-7) 
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on during the 1970s. One major influence of the Shiite sect was Imam Musa Al Sadr. 
Since his primary goal was to support the development of the Shiite community in 
Lebanon, Imam Al Sadr established the Movement of the Deprived (Harakat Al 
Mahroumin) to voice the social and economic needs of the Shiites in Lebanon and 
criticize the political process in the country149. Alongside building schooling 
institutions, medical facilities, religious associations and social welfare networks, Al 
Sadr also supported the arming of Shiite members to fight against Israeli invasions 
especially in regions like the South and the Bekaa150.  
Another stimulus to the Shiite community in Lebanon had been the Iranian 
revolution of 1979. The ideals put forward by Ayatollah Khomeini promoting the 
need for justice in the Muslim world, adopting the Palestinian cause and holding a 
responsibility to liberate the Palestinian lands from Israeli occupation, as well as 
classifying the United States as an enemy became an inspiration to which a great 
number of the Shiites followed through151. Accordingly, being the center of the 
Shiite sect and practices and a Shiite governed country, Iran directly became an 
external ally of the local Shiites of Lebanon152.  
Later, after the civil war came to an end the Shiites of Lebanon, and more 
specifically Hezbollah established an alliance with Syria. Although a major number 
of political parties and representatives voiced their support for Syria after the civil 
war due to the latter’s control over Lebanon, Hezbollah built a different relationship 
that the party preserved even after the Syrian withdrawal in 2005. The party claims 
that its principles contradicted with the Syrian methods employed in Lebanon and the 
                                                             
149 (Salibi K. S., Cross Roads to Civil War: Lebanon 1958-1976, 1976, p. 78) 
150 (Salibi K. S., Cross Roads to Civil War: Lebanon 1958-1976, 1976, p. 78) 
151 (Fuller, 2006-07, pp. 146-147) 
152 Iran became even closer to the Shiites of Lebanon following the establishment of Hezbollah 
after the Israeli invasion of Beirut in 1982. Hezbollah became a primary representative of the 
Shiites in Lebanon, while being a major ally of Iran in Lebanon and the region.  
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non-sovereign form of governance that existed during the Syrian presence in the 
country until 2005, but Hezbollah also explains that the connection with Syria was a 
required strategic alliance in its fight against the Israeli occupation153.  
By becoming close to Syria, especially prior to 2005, Hezbollah protected its 
arms and the resistance movement against any governmental decision that may 
negatively affect the continuation of the movement or its role, since the decision 
making process was influenced by the Syrian presence154. The party also gained a 
pathway through the Syrian territory for the armed support that it receives from Iran 
for the purpose of its battle against Israel. Since Syria is the only ally to Hezbollah 
and Iran in the region, the link that its land provides between the two sides is 
essential to the relationship that exists between Iran and Hezbollah. In exchange, and 
while in Lebanon, Syria also had an effect on the decisions of Hezbollah and the 
actions of the resistance branch against the Israeli occupation. Ultimately, Syria 
benefitted from this influence in the negotiations with Israel over the retrieval of the 
Golan Heights that were occupied in 1967155. Moreover, since the regime in Syria is 
controlled by the Alawites who represent a minority in the country compared to the 
Sunnis of Syria, the regime needed the protection of the Shiites in the region since 
they are considered the closest sect to the Alawites156. As a result, Syria built a 
coalition with Iran and Hezbollah based on religious similarities between the two 
sects as well as a shared need for a strategic alliance following political isolation in 
the region157. However, the role of Syria as a route for the arms of Hezbollah has 
                                                             
153 (Fadlallah H. , 2015, pp. 118-121) 
154 (Fadlallah H. , 2015, pp. 118-121) 
155 (Moubarak, 2003, pp. 20-22) 
156 (Talhamy, 2009, pp. 561-565) The Alawites tried for many years to prove that they, as a sect, are 
members of the Muslim religion in order to be accepted in the Muslim Arab world. They have 
collected several statements from prominent religious figures in the region to prove their belonging, 
especially from Shiite clerics who they share with a few common points of their beliefs.  
157 (Talhamy, 2009, pp. 569-573) 
 60 
been hindered by the civil war that began in Syria in 2011 due to the fighting that 
took over the country and the spread of the opposition armed groups through various 
regions in Syria. In order to protect their alliance and their interests, both Iran and 
Hezbollah became directly involved in the conflict in Syria to support the regime 
against the opposition.    
As Lebanon’s independence was officially recognized in 1943, working 
under a common political system became inevitable for each of the different sects of 
Lebanon. Nonetheless, each of the sectarian subcultures held fears of being 
dominated or oppressed by another, given that none of the sects formed an absolute 
majority. As a result, leaders of the various communities in Lebanon moved to adopt 
the sect- based consociational system in Lebanon as a guarantee to their relative 
powers in the political system of the country. The Maronites for example, although 
they had interest in the additional lands that came to make the new Lebanon, were 
insecure about the demographic changes that were in favor of the Muslims of the 
country, that would eventually shift the local balance of power to the advantage of 
the latter. After all, Muslims of the country had higher fertility rates and the 
Christians had higher numbers of emigration. In fact, statistics show that while the 
fertility rate of the Muslims in 1971 were at 5.44 that of the Christians was at 3.56, 
divided among the Shiites at 6.65, Sunnis at 5.2, the Maronites at 3.75 and other 
members of the Christian community in the country at 3.35158. The same statistics 
also reveal that between 1975 and 1984 emigration among the Christians reached 
78% compared to 22% among the Muslims of the country159. Adding to that, the 
Christians are a minority in a Muslim-Sunni dominated region.  
                                                             
158 (Lebanese Information Center, 2013, p. 11) 
159 (Lebanese Information Center, 2013, p. 4) 
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The Sunnis were hesitant about joining a political system with the Maronites 
who held the larger amount of power in the country and were more at ease with the 
West, when the former were mostly devoted pan-Arabs. As for the Shiites, they had 
little impact on the system as they were the most underprivileged of the sects but 
managed to fill in the position of the speaker of the parliament, while the power of 
the Druze had been overpowered by that of the Sunnis ever since the territories of 
Lebanon expanded.  
Few years after the independence, and specifically after World War II the 
concept of parties became more popular and so the Lebanese arena began to witness 
the establishment of a number of new political parties160. Now that an organized 
institution was needed, every sect designed a party where the zaim held the 
leadership. Some examples of those were the Kataib party (Phalangist party) of the 
Matonite Gemayel family, the National Bloc of Emile Edde who was also a Maronite 
and the Constitutional Bloc of Bechara El Khoury, as well as the Sunni Najjada 
party. Ideologically inspired parties were also formed in the period prior to the civil 
war of 1975, like the Baath party affected by that of Iraq, the Lebanese Communist 
party or even the Syrian Social Nationalist Party which believed in a borderless 
Greater Syria161. Later during the civil war more parties developed – many of which 
acted as militias as well-, as the Lebanese Forces for instance that defected from the 
larger Kataib party, or the Shiite party of Amal or even the Independent Nasserist 
Movement (Al Murabitoun) that was a pan-Arab party, in addition to imported 
political parties as the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). 
                                                             
160 (Hamzeh, Clientalism, Lebanon: Roots and Trends , 2001, p. 173) 
161 (Khazen, Political Parties in Postwar Lebanon: Parties in Search of Partisans , 2003, pp. 606-609) 
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Hence, Lebanon’s parties were now the representatives of the people through 
members elected to seats in the parliament rather than just the person of the zaim, 
and due to the sect-based consociational system of Lebanon parties “have generally 
reflected the communal nature of society and few were able to overcome the 
confessional barrier”162. Therefore, external affiliations to the more powerful 
regional or even international actors based on common sectarian identities were now 
mirrored through the local parties of the country. Moreover, since consociational 
governance was not eliminated by the Taif of 1989 but rather reinforced through a 
modified formula of power sharing, several of the parties that remained active after 
1990 and still operate under the present political system of Lebanon along with new 
post-war parties have developed even closer relations with external actors.  
The Sunnis are most connected to the Sunni-ruled countries of the Gulf and 
so parties like the Future Movement, for example, representing the Sunnis in 
Lebanon are allied specifically with Saudi Arabia given the religious similarities that 
they hold. Even some of the more radical Sunni groups of Lebanon claim to be 
supported by countries from the Gulf like Qatar and Saudi Arabia. The Shiites are 
affiliates of Iran as in the case of the Amal party and more importantly Hezbollah, 
and are even close to the Alawite ruled Syria. As for the Christians of Lebanon, 
although they have often been associated with the West, whether Europe or the US, 
the changing politics of Lebanon pushed the Christian parties of the country to form 
alliances that protect their set of interests rather than sect or religion163. For instance, 
                                                             
162 (Khazen, Political Parties in Postwar Lebanon: Parties in Search of Partisans , 2003, p. 606) 
163 Following the end of the civil war in 1989 the political environment in Lebanon changed 
significantly. The Taif provided the Muslims of the country with increased political power 
divided between the positions of the Sunni Prime Minister and the Shiite Speaker of the 
Parliament, while the power of the Maronites diminished. In addition, even though no official 
census had been conducted since 1932 in order to determine the demographic characteristics of 
Lebanon, it is widely acknowledged that the Maronites no longer represent the majority in the 
country. Moreover, the Middle East region and specifically the Arab world had divided between 
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even though the Maronites represent a majority among the Christians of Lebanon, 
the major Maronite parties of the country like the Lebanese Forces, the Kataib Party 
and the Free Patriotic Movement have divided between supporters of the Sunnis and 
allies of the Shiites. While the first two groups became joined the March 14 alliance 
with the Sunni Future Movement and ally of Saudi Arabia, General Michel Aoun of 
the Free Patriotic Movement allied with Hezbollah, the main supporter of Iran in 
Lebanon. Yet, those inter-sectarian alliances between the Muslim and the Christian 
parties of Lebanon did not overshadow the significance of the Maronite sectarian 
identity within the Christian political groups, since the sect remains the primary 
element of representation, power and interest in the country.  
 
Geographical Pressures 
Where Lebanon lays geographically has a direct effect on the country’s 
politics, economy, military performance and even its society and culture. Actually, 
due to the fact that Lebanon’s sectarian division has defected its political system and 
empowered the sectarian identity over the sense of national identity in many ways, 
Lebanon’s internal politics became more vulnerable to pressure emanating from its 
geographical position. The most important form of pressure that the country suffers 
from is that of conflict, whether it was an armed one, an ideological competition or 
even a race aiming at shifting the balance of power in the region.  
One rivalry that has long reverberated in the politics and culture of Lebanon 
is the centuries old antagonism between the Sunnis and the Shiites. Historically, the 
                                                                                                                                                                            
two major poles, the Saudi Arabia and Gulf counties Sunni coalition and the Iran, Syria and 
Hezbollah Shiite and to a lesser extent Alawite alliance. As a result, these internal and regional 
changes affected and eventually altered the interests, agendas as well as strategies of the 
Christians, and mainly the Maronites, of Lebanon.  
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animosity between the two sects can be traced down to the earlier days of Islam and 
to disputes over power succession164. One, as the region developed and the nation-
state came into existence each of the sects occupied a specific area, of a size that 
either expanded or diminished during invasions and concurring, until they finally 
settled into their present day countries. While the Shiites became the dominant 
culture in Iran and branches of the sect spread to countries like Iraq and Lebanon 
among others, the Sunnis were the majority in the gulf and other Arab countries of 
North Africa. 
Consequently, a Sunni rule took over the countries of the gulf that had a 
Sunni absolute majority and Iran adopted Shiism as the base of its political system 
ever since the Iranian revolution succeeded under the leadership of Ayatollah 
Khomeini in 1979. Of course, some countries were an exception to this pattern, as 
Bahrain for example that is Shiite in majority but is ruled by a Sunni monarchy, 
Syria that is governed by the Alawite minority when the Sunnis are the largest sect in 
the country, and Iraq under Saddam Hussein who empowered Sunnis over a Shiite 
majority. Adding to that, not all countries of the region use religion equally as part of 
their political system. While in Saudi Arabia and Iran religion is implemented in a 
rather strict way, other countries have suppressed attempts to introduce religion into 
the system as in Syria for example or Egypt under former president Husni Moubarak.   
Two, the remains of the historical clashes also increased the amount of 
wariness between the two sects, which was soon officially recognized through the 
religious political systems of the region and thus was transformed into political 
distrust and a battle of regional power that could also be detected in the internal 
politics of Lebanon. The main actors in this regional sectarian dilemma are the most 
                                                             
164 (Fuller, 2006-07, pp. 144-145) 
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powerful countries representing the two sects, specifically Iran and the countries of 
the gulf led by Saudi Arabia. Since the two sides are very close geographically, both 
strive to preserve their influence in the region, though in different ways, as to deter 
any chance by the other to shift the balance of power in their favor. While Saudi 
Arabia maintains a close relationship with the US, whose in conflict with Iran ever 
since the Shah was ousted by the Iranian revolution and the new system perceived 
the US as an enemy, Iran focuses on empowering the Shiites of the region and builds 
close relations with the those states opposing to the US, as Russia for example.  
The general disagreement over religious interpretations -as a result of the 
dispute over succession in the early Islamic Caliphate- divides the Sunni and the 
Shiites of Lebanon when it comes to the practice of religion in a similar manner to 
the division on the regional level. Yet, having a heterogeneous society where none of 
the sects is an absolute majority, Lebanon adopted a political system that is greatly 
different from any other form of governance employed in the region. Nonetheless, 
since the sectarian identity is a key element of politics and society in Lebanon, the 
Sunni-Shiite hostility easily entered the system of the country.  
Therefore, since Lebanon’s Muslims have close connections with their 
sectarian identities outside the country, a Sunni or a Shiite citizen often feels a 
responsibility to defend their sect thus bringing the regional rivalry internally. More 
importantly, local sectarian parties also make an effort to voice their support for their 
respective external allies, holding positions that match those of the bigger powers 
they are linked to. It is common for instance for a member of the Future Movement 
to accuse Iran and the Shiites of having a bigger plan that aims to overpower the 
Sunnis of the region, or blame Iran and its local allies – Amal and Hezbollah- for the 
instability in Lebanon and the Levant, claiming that their radical Shiite ideology and 
 66 
Iran’s nuclear project produce uncertainty especially with the US and other countries 
of the West. Since Iran, along with Hezbollah, hold very antagonistic views towards 
the Israeli occupation of Palestine, their arms pose a threat to Israel and hence are a 
concern to the US as well. The tension between Iran and its allies and Israel and its 
allies keeps the future of the region and the possibility of peace unclear. In fact, the 
statements of political representatives often demonstrate the division that exists 
between the political factions in Lebanon as well as the significance of sectarian 
affiliations that exist across the borders.  
For example, one statement by the leader of the Future Movement, Prime 
Minister Saad Al Hariri, that shows the position of the party towards Iran and 
Hezbollah in comparison to the party’s relationship with Saudi Arabia is, “the 
determination to place Iran’s interests above the interests of Lebanon, is a situation 
present for years, we will not acknowledge its usefulness and it will not push us 
today to comply with it through hasty responses. As for the relationship with Saudi 
Arabia and the Gulf countries, it was and it will remain greater than being shaken by 
the offenses and tendentious campaigns, Saudi Arabia offered to Lebanon and the 
Arab countries well-being and peace and sincere brotherly support, and others 
offered and still offer advanced projects for war and disputes and dominance”165. 
Similarly, Hezbollah criticizes the relationship between the US and Saudi 
Arabia – as well as other Gulf countries-, arguing that the former conspires with 
Israel to weaken the region in general and those who are against their policies in 
particular as part of an interest plan that they seek to achieve. For example, in one of 
his speeches on the role of Hezbollah in the fight against Israel, the Secretary 
General of Hezbollah Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah said, “Israel feels comfortable in 
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front of some Arab countries’ huge armies because the decision-making of these 
regimes is within the US”166.  
Although the Christians of Lebanon may not be directly involved in the 
Sunni-Shiite dilemma, political parties representing them are nevertheless drawn to 
choose a side. On one hand, parties like the Lebanese Forces, the Kataib party, the 
Free Patriotic Movement or the Marada Movement, all have a set of beliefs that 
shape their interests and goals. These beliefs and interests can either match those of 
Saudi Arabia for example or that of Iran, and thus direct the attention of the local 
Christian parties towards one external actor and against another. Parties that prefer a 
peaceful settlement in Palestine for instance or consider that the armed branch of 
Hezbollah and the position of Iran pose a threat to the stability of the region would 
not build relations with the Shiite side, but rather incline towards the Sunnis. The 
opposite is also true, Christian parties that believe arms are needed to face the Israeli 
occupation or that the US policies are used to restrict the capabilities of countries in 
the Arab world, would then favor the Shiite camp. Other parties in Lebanon also 
follow the same pattern to side with either the Sunni external ally or the Shiite, like 
the Druze Progressive Socialist Party or even secular parties like the Syrian Socialist 
Nationalist Party.  
On the other hand, the non-Muslim parties of Lebanon also form local 
political blocs with either the Sunni or the Shiite parties of the country. They often 
have similar points of view, share common interests and seek to maintain a coherent 
alliance where one way to do that is to back the decisions and actions of other 
members of the coalition, and eventually build relations with their relative external 
allies. For example, the Free Patriotic Movement may not be interested in the 
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Palestinian issue as much as the Shiite members of March 8 but would still back 
Hezbollah’s decision to continue their hold of an armed resistance group or become 
closer to Iran. Likewise, the Lebanese Forces or the Kataib party may worry about 
Sunni domination and the decrease of the Christian- specifically Maronite- power in 
Lebanon, but would remain in support of the Sunni groups of March 14 and try to 
have better connections with the Sunni countries of the gulf.  
Furthermore, in addition to the Sunni-Shiite rivalry other forms of conflict 
over interests and struggles over power in the Arab world affect the political system 
of Lebanon as a result of the imperfect sense of national identity in the country, the 
rise of the sectarian identity and the affiliations that have been built across the 
borders. Although some political groups may hold similar positions with external 
actors due to the commonality of beliefs and principles, many have to offer more 
than political statements in order to fulfill their role in the patron-client relationship 
that exists between the two sides. In return for protection and support from the 
outside, local parties reciprocate by offering loyalty to external actors thus providing 
them with an access to influence the internal politics of Lebanon so that they match 
their interests in the region.  
The process of exchange between an external patron and an internal political 
group can take place when two conditions are available: one, the external ally has a 
certain set of interests in the Arab region that they seek to reach or are involved in 
the power competition of the region, and two, the external ally must have a party 
acting as a client within the Lebanese political system. For the first factor, the Sunni-
Shiite rivalry, the oil reserves in the Arab gulf and some Arab countries of North 
Africa, the Israeli occupation of Palestine and the existence of Islamic fundamentalist 
groups are all features that made the Middle East and North African region an area of 
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interest to countries other than those of the Gulf or Iran, including powers like the 
US, Russia and some countries in Europe167. As for the second, a majority of the 
local parties of Lebanon work closely with external actors due to the distrust that has 
grown over the years between the different sects, or out of conviction that they share 
the same beliefs with those actors rather than other factions within Lebanon. 
Accordingly, several examples can be found of when local political groups in 
Lebanon represent the power capabilities of their respective allies and political 
events occurring within the country were a reflection of disputes on the regional or 
even international level.  
For instance, during the civil war and more importantly after the invasion of 
1982 Iran gathered independent Shiite factions fighting against the Israeli troops 
under one group, Hezbollah, in order to protect the sect in a heterogeneous and 
turbulent Lebanon168. The party adopted the principle of Wilayat Al Fakih and 
building an Islamic state in Lebanon became one of its goals before its 
“lebanonization” process began following the end of the civil war169. Also, liberating 
lands occupied by Israel was another major target that the party aimed to achieve. 
The work, objectives and interests of Hezbollah remain in parallel with those of Iran 
as the party continues to receive financial and military aid from its regional and 
ideological ally.  
Another country that built close relations with Hezbollah is Syria. Although 
the latter had for long rigid policies towards parties with religious backgrounds, 
many have argued that having a certain amount of influence over Hezbollah’s 
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decisions and actions is an element that Syria can make use of during negotiations 
with Israel over the Golan Heights170. After all, Hezbollah needed the consent of 
Syria to maintain its armed resistance movement ever since the Syrian apparatus took 
control over Lebanon after the Taif of 1989171. Syria has also fought alongside the 
Christians of Lebanon, specifically the Kataib party, during the first year of the civil 
war when both were feeling threatened by the growing power of the Palestinian 
groups in Lebanon and especially the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). Yet, 
soon the Christians shifted to form a new coalition against Syria as well as the 
Palestinians; the former then moved its support towards the Druze and the Shiite 
groups of the country, Amal and eventually Hezbollah172.  
The separate peace agreement that was being put together between Egypt and 
the Israelis also pushed the Druze and more specifically the National Movement led 
by Kamal Jumblatt to incline more towards Syria and the Soviet Union, who in turn 
needed an internal ally in Lebanon during the civil war to disrupt the peace talks in 
the region173. The National Movement was a pan-Arab group that supported the 
Palestinians and rallied against the sectarian power-sharing formula in Lebanon, and 
thus needed the support of a powerful external actor when facing the Christian-
dominated Lebanese Front. Syria was concerned about being left out of the peace 
agreement in the region and the Soviet Union was against the advancement of the US 
agenda in the Middle East174. Under such circumstances the relationship between the 
Lebanese National Movement, Syria and the Soviet Union developed during the civil 
war. Of course, this does not imply that the work of political parties in Lebanon is 
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completely dictated by their external allies. The local groups consider the preferences 
of external patrons especially when they are receiving support in return – whether 
material or in terms of power-, but they also enjoy a significant degree of autonomy 
over their decisions and actions, which has further increased following the 
withdrawal of Syrian troops from the country.  
Moreover, the Palestinian-Israeli issue is also a conflict in the region that has 
caused pressure on the political system in Lebanon on more than one level. The first 
group that was motivated to react against the occupation of Palestine was that of pan-
Arabs. Although a majority were Sunni Muslims, members of other sects and secular 
parties also joined as the Lebanese Communist Party for example or the Druze 
Progressive Socialist Party or even the Syrian Social Nationalist Party. A second 
group that voiced their support to the Palestinians and their fight against the Israeli 
occupation was mainly of Sunni pan-Islamists, who were further provoked following 
the failure of the Arab countries in their confrontations with Israel during the six 
days war in 1967. While the latter two factions were determined to help the 
Palestinians not only through humanitarian aid but using military resistance as well, 
a significant number of the Christian community – whether members of the political 
body or not- were concerned about the changes in the region and their repercussions 
on Lebanon.  
Although the power-sharing formula was still based on the census of 1932 
giving a considerable amount of power for the Maronite president, the demographics 
of the country were changing due to the higher fertility rates of the Muslims and so 
the influx of large numbers of Sunni Palestinians was considered an additional threat 
 72 
to the power of the Christians in Lebanon175. After all, among the Palestinians 
entering the country around 85% were Sunni Muslims, thus making the 
naturalization of Palestinian refugees a very sensitive subject176. In fact, in order to 
reduce the effect of the demographic differences the local Christians reacted by 
targeting the Christian Palestinians, giving the Lebanese nationality to almost 28,000 
members by 1951177.  
Along with the dilemma around demography came political division on 
whether the Palestinian resistance groups should be allowed to use the Lebanese 
territory in their fight against the Israeli occupation or not. As public frustration was 
on the rise following the outcomes of the 1967 war between the Arab forces and 
Israel, armed groups in Lebanon began to take more action against the occupation 
using areas on the borders in the South. Soon afterwards the PLO moved its 
headquarters to Beirut after they were forced to leave Jordan in 1970.  
Several regions of the country had to suffer from retaliations from the Israeli 
side. One example is the events of 1968 when the Beirut airport was attacked by the 
Israelis causing significant damage, which the Christian “Hilf” bloc blamed on the 
Palestinian resistance movements178. Later on, the Palestinian armed movements 
clashed with Christian groups –especially the Kataib party- and the army. In fact, the 
army was accused of bias since it was supported by a large number of Maronites in 
its fight against the Palestinian resistance groups. Similar incidents became recurrent 
during the few years leading up to the beginning of the civil war in 1975. Even 
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governmental processes became harder as blocs formed with the rise of sectarian 
tension in the country, and Sunni Prime Ministers either resigned or failed to bring 
the opposing groups into agreement on how to deal with the Palestinian issue179.  
The local political division over the Palestinian presence in Lebanon was also 
reflected during the 1982 Israeli invasion against the PLO. The Lebanese National 
Movement (LNM) encompassing pro-Arabs, Palestinian groups and a number of 
secular parties fought alongside the Palestinians and against Israel whose troops had 
reached Beirut180. As for the Maronite parties, they continued to take action against 
the Palestinian resistance groups, the most prominent of which was the Lebanese 
Forces under the leadership of Bachir Gemayel. Even Shiites, divided between 
members of Amal and independents, took part in the clashes against the Israeli 
troops. Ultimately, the events of 1982 led to significant changes in the Lebanese 
political arena. The attempts of the LNM were far from successful, the PLO had to 
evacuate Beirut towards Tripoli and eventually to Tunisia, President Bachir Gemayel 
was assassinated and Israeli withdrew its forces in 1985. Adding to that, the Shiite 
involvement marked the beginning of the military activity of Hezbollah in the form 
of an Islamic resistance to Israel, before the entity was finally announced as an 
official political party in an “Open Letter” in February of 1985181.    
 The internal politics of Lebanon faced further pressure when Lebanon’s 
future with the Palestinian movements and Israel coincided with the interests of other 
states in the region. Syria, for example, favored peaceful Lebanese borders that 
would hold no threat of an Israeli invasion on its borders. After the 1967 Arab-Israeli 
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war the Golan Heights in Syria fell under Israeli occupation. As a result, Syria 
intended to protect other borders that are in common with Lebanon and at the same 
time keep the possibility of retrieving the Golan Heights from Israel open182. In order 
to attain its plan Syria entered Lebanon in 1976 to fight the Palestinian presence 
alongside the Christians of the country, and continued its battle against the PLO until 
the latter left Lebanon in December of 1983183. Still, other countries saw in an 
internally troubled Lebanon an opportunity to advance their political role in the 
region and shift the balance of power in their favor, as was the case with Iraq for 
example. For Iraq, instability on the Syrian borders would weaken Syria thus giving 
the former a chance to acquire a more influential role in the politics of the region184. 
Local contenders in Lebanon received political and material support from the 
interested countries, which further contributed to the internal division that had 
transformed into a civil war in 1975. Not to forget, the Lebanese political system 
encountered an increased amount of economic and social burdens with the entrance 
of large numbers of refugees into the country. 
Even many years after the civil war ended, the politics in Lebanon are still 
affected by the Palestinian issue that is far from being resolved. One, there is the 
constant debate over whether the Lebanese Army possesses the capacity to protect 
the Lebanese borders from the Israeli threat and the ability to subdue an Israeli 
offensive if it happens. Two, on the other side of the debate over the security of the 
land in Lebanon lays Hezbollah with the argument that the party’s armed branch, the 
Lebanese Islamic Resistance, is sustained for the sole reason of defending Lebanon 
against Israeli aggression. Even though the liberation of Lebanese territory from 
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Israeli occupation has been acknowledged on the 25th of May 2000, an achievement 
accredited to the Islamic Resistance, Hezbollah insists that the mission is not over 
since the Shebaa farms are yet to be liberated185. Yet, Hezbollah’s acquisition of 
arms is denounced by a significant number of political parties, mainly members the 
March 14 bloc, and even members of the Lebanese society, who both consider the 
Islamic Resistance as a source of power for the party, yet with negative implications 
on Lebanon186.    
Three, the naturalization of Palestinians – though unlikely to happen- is still 
perceived as a threat to the power of the Christians in Lebanon, and the Palestinian 
camps remain a controversial topic187. In fact, with politically active resistance 
groups as in Ain al-Helweh camp in Sidon or the Naher al-Bared camp in the North 
of the country, Palestinian camps still pose a security issue for the government. Not 
only do these camps have groups that are armed and have fought one another on 
several occasions, but they have also encompassed a number of Islamic 
fundamentalist groups over the years. Therefore, the question of whether the 
government should get directly involved in managing the camps’ security or not has 
been raised on several occasions. Although the internal security forces (ISF) did 
establish a unit inside the Nahr al-Bared camp and the Lebanese army is also present 
there, Nahr al-Bared became an exception following the clashes between Fath al-
Islam and the Lebanese Army in 2007188. Otherwise, the security forces are not 
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present inside any other camp even though the government managed to maintain 
close monitoring over the camps during the last few years.  
Furthermore, political parties in Lebanon adopted distinct positions towards 
the management of those camps. While Christians and members of the Future 
Movement prefer that the government and Lebanese security forces be in charge of 
security in the camps, where arms should be very well controlled, Hezbollah fears 
that a plan of disarmament in the camps would ultimately lead to a decision 
regarding the party’s arms as well189. Likewise, Palestinian factions also divided on 
the matter depending on their own interests and the connections they have mainly 
built with Muslim Lebanese political parties190. 
 
Sectarian Identities, Regional Instability and Fundamentalist Impulses 
The prevalence of the sectarian identity in Lebanon and the development of 
sect-based connections to external actors facilitated the infiltration of regional 
disputes into the country. The end result was political instability characterized by 
aggravated feelings of marginalization and weak representation among the people as 
well as division in opinions over the events that were taking place in the region, and 
thus different reactions among the active political factions in the country. While 
certain groups chose to use political activism to express their views, several used 
weapons to defend their beliefs and some resorted to religious extremism. In the case 
of the latter, Islamic fundamentalism was either a reaction to the failure of certain 
ideologies - pan-Arabism in this case -, or to assist Muslim communities in their 
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defense against what Islamists categorize as enemies and infidels or it could have 
been a result of both.  
In fact, salafi jihadi Palestinian resistance groups were the product of both 
failed ideologies and the assumption that Muslims were at war with enemies of their 
religion. After the 1967 war and the inability of Arab regimes to help the Palestinians 
in their struggle against the Israeli occupation and the end of the unified United Arab 
Republic of Egypt and Syria in 1961, two ideas became popular among a significant 
number of pan-Arabs191. First, Arabism was not the solution to what the Palestinians 
were facing and Arab rulers are mostly incapable – and at times even unwilling- to 
defend the Palestinians. Second, the Israeli occupation is a war against Muslims and 
thus the alternative ideology could be Islamism and a jihad war.  
The Islamic Jihad Movement (al-Haraka al-Islamiya al-Mujahida) was one 
radical resistance group that was established in 1975 under the leadership of Sheikh 
Hamed Abu Naser in Ain El Helweh camp in Sidon192. In addition to the already 
existing frustration with the Arab regimes the year 1975 marked the beginning of the 
civil war in Lebanon, a time when some Maronite factions clashed on several 
occasion with Palestinian resistance groups. Also, few years later in 1982 armed 
Palestinian groups had to fight against the Israeli invasion as well as Maronite forces, 
who also wanted to push the Palestinian resistance groups out of Lebanon. This gave 
reason enough for rising Palestinian Islamists like the Islamic Jihad Movement to 
believe that they were in a fight against groups who are “waging a cultural and 
ideological war against Islam to wipe out Islamic civilization and control Muslim 
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lands”193. As a result, the Islamic Jihad Movement strived to protect the ummah and 
thus took part in several wars, mainly against Israel in 1978 and 1982 and later 
alongside the Palestinians during the camp wars for a limited amount of time. Sheikh 
Abu Naser, the first “emir” of the movement, also followed a strict approach towards 
the right clothing, good behavior and religious obligations as prayers for example in 
the camp of Ain el-Helweh, in an attempt to enforce religion in what he thought was 
the right way194.   
Usbat al-Ansar is a second Jihadi Palestinian group that was developed under 
similar circumstances as the Islamic Jihad Movement later in 1986 by Sheikh 
Hisham Sharaydi, who had been involved in the battles against Israel during the 
invasion of 1982. In general, Usbat al- Ansar grew out of the idea that “Islam was the 
only correct solution”195. Although the group denied in 2001 that it had connections 
with al-Qaeda, some of its members were involved in the fighting with al-Qaeda 
against the US troops in Iraq196. The group was also accused of carrying out 
assassinations both in 1995 and 1999, the latter year including 3 Lebanese lawyers, 
and later in 2002 they were responsible for the killing of soldiers from the Lebanese 
Army during a surveillance mission of members of the group197. Nevertheless, the 
track of activism of Usbat al-Ansar had been significantly altered following the Nahr 
al-Bared clashes between the army and Fath al-Islam, resulting in more cooperation 
between resistance groups in the camps, including Usbat al-Ansar, and the Lebanese 
security forces.  
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Although both the Islamic Jihad Movement and Usbat al-Ansar are non-
Lebanese factions they were both capable of growing within Lebanon due to the 
political changes and the turmoil of the civil war, specifically the several wars 
against existing Palestinian groups in Lebanon, the Israeli invasion of 1982 and the 
identity crisis that had been awakened by the sectarian armed conflicts of the war. 
Even though several movements in Lebanon that supported the Palestinians in their 
fight against the Israeli occupation were inspired by pan-Arabism, the issue soon 
took a sectarian form not only due to the failure of the latter ideology but also as a 
result of the rising sectarian tensions in Lebanon.  
Disparity over the sect-based power distribution, which had been influenced 
by the growing importance of the sectarian identity over the years, was one major 
factor that led to the civil war of 1975. As a result, most of the battles of the civil war 
were among groups representing the major sectarian identities of the country, mainly 
Druze, Maronites, Sunnis and Shiites, in an attempt to protect the sect against any 
form of political, social or economic marginalization. Under such circumstances, and 
especially when pan-Arabism seemed to have failed, many Muslims in the country 
adopted the Palestinian issue and several non-Lebanese Islamists were allowed to 
take action against the Israeli occupation from Lebanon due to the common religious 
identity that existed between the two sides, even when they did not belong to the 
same country and shared different nationalities. Islamists found a safe ground in 
Lebanon where they could be supported by a significant number of local political 
groups and sectarian subcultures, especially when official authorities had little 
control over the country due to the civil war.  
Similarly, the shared sectarian identity between the Sunni community in 
Lebanon and that of Iraq pushed several Sunni-Lebanese to join the war in Iraq 
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against US troops. In addition to members of extremist groups like Usbat al-Ansar 
from the Ain al-Helweh camp, a number of Lebanese nationals joined the fight in 
order to help Iraq, protect the ummah from the enemy and support the Sunnis of Iraq 
in their armed struggle against the Shiites. In fact, a Lebanese from Majdal Anjar 
became the leader of a group known as Ansar al-Islam in Iraq responsible for attacks 
against the US army. He also encouraged several others from the same region to 
fight in Iraq as well198. Even though Lebanon did not witness a form of repercussion 
following the events in Iraq similar to what had happened after the Israeli occupation 
of Palestine, nationals were also motivated by their sectarian identities to get 
involved directly in issues that were beyond Lebanon’s borders.  
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Chapter 3 
Lebanon, the Syrian Civil War and the Rise of Salafi 
Jihadism 
 
The vibrant fundamentalist environment that is overwhelming Lebanon’s 
politics and security, as a reaction to the ongoing turmoil in Syria, is not the first of 
its kind during the country’s history. In fact, the country did have an earlier 
experience with the fundamentalist ideology shortly after the 1948 Al Nakba in 
Palestine, and more heavily after the Arab- Israeli 1967 war and up until the early 
1980s. The Muslim sentiments that were aroused by the Palestinian problem were 
hard to control especially that Lebanon had been in a civil war that began in 1975 
and lasted until 1990. Groups like the “Islamic Unity Movement” or the “Popular 
Resistance” for instance – in Tripoli, North of Lebanon- did not cease to fight, 
specifically against the Syrian troops that were trying hard to drive the Palestinian 
resistance movements out of Lebanon199.  
More than twenty years after the civil war ended, a new regional crisis 
emerged in Syria and once again Lebanon struggles from repercussions in the form 
of radical Islamism. Lebanon became a direct target of Islamist fundamentalist 
groups and the events in the region were now a new source of contention between 
the March 14 and March 8 blocs in Lebanon. Yet, why is Lebanon a country 
susceptible to such episodes of Salafi Jihadism, how did the Arab uprisings and civil 
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war in Syria contribute to the new wave and what are the limits of this phenomenon 
in Lebanon if any exist? 
The chapter will begin by outlining the main events that characterized the 
internal political environment in Lebanon before the civil war in Syria began, 
specifically post-2005, and then the connection that exists between the events in 
Syria and the political process in Lebanon as well as the rise of Salafi Jihadism – and 
even political Islamism- in the country. In order to prove the relationship between the 
internal and external weakness of the country and the escalation of the Jihadist 
ideology within its territories, two case studies representing recent events in Tripoli 
and Sidon will be tackled in the chapter. Through discussing the two cases, the 
causes and the aftermath of the Jihadi phenomenon will be clarified. The chapter will 
then end by pointing out the limitations that this occurrence faces in Lebanon even 
when the political system has facilitated its emergence. 
 
Lebanon Since 2005 
As in the case of fundamentalism during the civil war, sectarian tension had 
been building up in the country before the new wave of Salafi Jihadism began 
following the civil war in Syria, and specifically since 2004. Actually, 2004 was a 
critical year for the political scene in Lebanon in many ways. One, it was the end of 
the six years term of President Emile Lahoud, who first came into office in 1998. 
Known for his close alliance with the Syrian apparatus that had been in Lebanon 
since 1976, the extension of Lahoud’s tenure was the first heated debate that 
Lebanon had to go through that year. While the Shiite parties of Amal and Hezbollah 
joined sides with the president and the Syrian allies, the idea of extending Lahoud’s 
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term in office faced great opposition, especially from the side of Prime Minister 
Rafik Al Hariri. Actually, the latter’s resistance to keeping Lahoud in presidency for 
a new term was part of a greater discontent, which had been growing internally 
almost since 2001, against the continuing Syrian presence in Lebanon. In addition to 
the Sunni Prime Minister Rafik Al Hariri, the Druze leader Walid Jumblatt and the 
Christian figures of the Qornet Shahwan grouping were dissatisfied with the Syrian 
hegemony over Lebanon as well; thus, making up a second political challenge that 
had greatly escalated by 2004200. Eventually, President Lahoud’s term was extended 
by three additional years after the constitutional amendment had successfully passed 
in parliament. However, the dilemma around the Syrian control on Lebanon was still 
far from being solved.  
Two, it is not only that internal resentment towards the Syrian presence in 
Lebanon was growing on the part of some members of the political body; Syria was 
also facing international pressure – mainly led by the US and France- to withdraw 
from Lebanon as a reaction to the regime’s disapproval of the US invasion of Iraq in 
2003201. In fact, the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1559 of September 
2, 2004 was the first internationally adopted action towards the Syrian regime202. 
Given that two of the main points from the 1559 Resolution were the departure of 
“foreign forces” from Lebanon and the “disbanding and disarmament of all Lebanese 
and non-Lebanese militias”203, the Lebanese political parties divided between two 
camps. While the Bristol camp- mainly including the Christian parties, Prime 
Minister Rafik Al Hariri, and Walid Jumblatt- supported the resolution and called for 
                                                             
200 (Khazen, Political Parties in Postwar Lebanon: Parties in Search of Partisans , 2003, pp. 621-
623) The Qornet Shahwan group came to the forefront in April of 2001 and mainly represented 
Christian political parties in Lebanon. The various members of the group agreed upon several 
political matters, one of which was the issue of the Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon.  
201 (Harris W. W., Crisis in the Levant: Lebanon at Risk?, 2007, p. 42) 
202 (Harris W. W., Crisis in the Levant: Lebanon at Risk?, 2007) 
203 (United Nations Security Council, Security Council Resolutions on Lebanon, 2004) 
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the exit of the Syrian forces and the decommissioning of the arms of Hezbollah, the 
Ain Al Tineh camp – including the Amal movement and the Hezbollah party- allied 
itself with Syria against all other groups204.  
Three, and amid such settings, the system received its biggest shock through 
the assassination of Prime Minister Rafik Al Hariri on the 14th of February 2005. The 
brutal murder of the Sunni Prime Minister, along with a series of other successful 
and failed assassination attempts against members of the opposition to Syria, was the 
trigger behind the Cedar Revolution under which Lebanon divided into two new 
alliances205. The first, March 14, joined the Future Movement of the Hariri family 
with Maronite parties as the Phalangist Party (Kataeb Party) of the Gemayels’ and 
the Lebanese Forces of Samir Gaegae and rallied against the Syrian regime. The 
second, March 8, maintained its alliance with Syria and included both Amal and 
Hezbollah and was later joined by the Free Patriotic movement of General Michel 
Aoun; who had defected from the Britstol camp. Although the Progressive Socialist 
Party of Walid Jumblatt was at first a part of the March 14 alliance, it later shifted its 
support as it often moved between the two blocs. Eventually, UN Security Council 
Resolution 1595 was adopted on April 7 of 2005 to start an investigation commission 
on the assassination of Prime Minister Rafik Al Hariri and soon afterwards on April 
26, the Syrian apparatus was out of Lebanon206.  
Nevertheless, the departure of the Syrian forces did not help stabilize the 
political arena in Lebanon. In fact, the situation was only getting worse. In 2006, the 
national dialogue failed to solve some of the most pressing political issues-especially 
                                                             
204 (Salamey, The Government and Politics of Lebanon, 2014, p. 64) 
205 (Salamey, The Government and Politics of Lebanon, 2014, p. 64) 
206 (Salamey, The Government and Politics of Lebanon, 2014, p. 65) 
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that of the disarmament of Hezbollah207. In July of the same year, a month-long war 
erupted between Hezbollah and Israel causing significant amounts of humanitarian, 
economic, and infrastructural damages; and in November, the cabinet of Fouad 
Siniora was deprived of its legitimacy following the resignation of Shiite ministers 
from the March 8 coalition208. In 2007, the three years presidential extension of 
Lahoud’s term came to an end without any consensus on who would be the next 
president. Finally the peak was reached in 2008 when the political disagreements of 
March 8 and March 14 were transformed into an armed conflict between the Sunnis 
and the Shiites in the streets of Beirut209. Actually, the May confrontations only came 
to a halt after a Qatari-led intervention that resulted in what came to be known as the 
Doha agreement; the first internationally sponsored treaty for internal reconciliation 
in Lebanon since the Taif of the 1989. Former commander of the Lebanese army, 
Michel Suleiman, was the new President as agreed upon during the discussions in 
Doha.  
 
Lebanon and the Civil War in Syria 
When it was assumed that the country was at a new start, the Arab uprisings 
began and the civil war erupted in Syria. Consequently, Lebanon now had to deal 
with a new set of political, economic and social pressures. On one hand, the intensity 
of the fights in Syria led to the displacement of a very large number of its citizens 
                                                             
207 (Najem, 2012, pp. 78-79) 
208 (Najem, 2012, p. 80) 
209 (Salamey, The Government and Politics of Lebanon, 2014, pp. 69-70) Armed supporters of 
Hezbollah and Amal took the streets in Beirut in May 7 fighting against armed followers of the 
Sunni Future Movements following the decisions adopted by the Siniora government two days 
before the clashes began. The first was to replace Wafik Shkair as the highest member of the 
security apparatus in the Rafik Al Hariri International Airport due to his close ties with 
Hezbollah and the second decision had to do with the telecommunication system that also 
belonged to Hezbollah.  
 86 
many of whom resorted to Lebanon where they took shelter in newly established or 
already existing refugee camps. According to the statistics of the UN High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the number of “registered” Syrian refugees 
in Lebanon reached a total of 1,174,830 by the end of June of 2015210. A significant 
number of Syrian nationals are also either not registered with the UNHCR yet or do 
not qualify as refugees211. Nonetheless, the large numbers of refugees entering 
Lebanon produced a series of constraints on the economy in the country, especially 
when unemployment and unequal distribution are problems that a significant number 
of the citizens in Lebanon had already been suffering from. Moreover, the 
government was now faced with new challenges when it came to meeting the needs 
and controlling the influx of the large numbers of people crossing the borders and 
escaping the war in Syria212.  
The burdens of securing shelters, food and medical support to the refugees 
overwhelmed the government in Lebanon even though several governmental and 
non-governmental international and local organizations offered – and continue to 
offer – a significant amount of assistance to both the government and the Syrian 
refugees213. Adding to that, members of the communities that are hosting the largest 
numbers of individuals from Syria are frequently voicing their discontent towards the 
economic situation especially that several of them blame the Syrian refugees for 
                                                             
210 (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2015) 
211 (Salem, Can Lebanon Survive the Syrian Crisis, 2012, pp. 7-8)  
212 (Salem, Can Lebanon Survive the Syrian Crisis, 2012, pp. 7-8) The majority of Lebanon’s borders 
are shared with Syria. This along with the fact that the state in Lebanon has a weak ability to 
control its borders, due to the limited size and ability of the security forces of the country, has 
made Lebanon a first destination for Syrian refugees. The borders are especially porous in 
regions where the villages on the borders that have a Sunni majority, as in the case of the North 
for example and Akkar, as well as the Bekaa and Arsal.  
213 (United Nations High Commissioner For Refugees) The most popular among the international 
organizations assisting the Syrian refugees in Lebanon is the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Refugees (UNHCR). In addition to working closely with the government in Lebanon in order 
to provide shelter, food and healthcare for the refugees, the UNHCR has built a large network for 
collaboration with other international and local organizations that are also working with Syrian 
refugees, even in countries other than Lebanon like Jordan, Iraq and even Turkey.  
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taking jobs and overpopulating their regions214. The refugees are also being held 
responsible for the increasing crime rates in some areas of the country, and are in 
return facing different forms of discrimination215. After all, a majority of the 
refugees, a total of 86%, have taken shelter in areas that are among the most troubled 
in Lebanon, thus aggravating the already harsh living conditions216.  
On the other hand, the civil war in Syria has severe repercussions on the 
political arena in Lebanon. By further dividing the powers of the region and 
deepening the sectarian division, especially between the Sunnis and the Shiites of the 
region and Lebanon, the war in Syria made consensus between the political actors in 
Lebanon very hard to achieve. While the Sunnis in the country who are mainly 
represented by the Future Movement, along with their allies in the March 14 
coalition, support the Syrian opposition against the Alawite regime of Bashar Al 
Assad, the Shiites and Hezbollah as well as other members of the March 8 bloc 
support the regime.  
As soon as the various political groups in Lebanon claimed their stand with 
either the regime in Syria or the opposition, the political cycle in Lebanon began to 
face frequent episodes of deadlock. After the break down of Saad Al Hariri’s 
government in January of 2011 following the resignation of ministers from the 
March 8 coalition, a new government was put together four months later under the 
leadership of Prime Minister Najib Mikati217. Although the latter “dissociated” the 
cabinet from the events in Syria, the absence of members from the March 14 
                                                             
214 (Khatib, Repercussions of the Syrian Refugee Crisis for Lebanon, 2014) 
215 (Khatib, Repercussions of the Syrian Refugee Crisis for Lebanon, 2014) 
216 (Khatib, Repercussions of the Syrian Refugee Crisis for Lebanon, 2014) 
217 (Salem, Can Lebanon Survive the Syrian Crisis, 2012, p. 6) Due to dispute over the Special Tribunal 
for Lebanon that was developed in order to investigate the assassination of Prime Minister Rafik Al 
Hariri, members of the March 8 coalition in the cabinet resigned, thus breaking down the cabinet of 
Prime Minister Saad Al Hariri in January of 2011.    
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coalition in the cabinet and the worsening security situation in Lebanon as the civil 
war in Syria developed pushed Prime Minister Mikati to resign from his position218. 
It took10 months for the next cabinet to be formed; after the resignation of Mikati in 
March of 2013 and under the leadership of Prime Minister Tammam Salam the new 
cabinet came into effect in February of 2014219. As for the parliament, elections that 
were scheduled to take place in 2013 were canceled following dispute over the 
elections law and concerns regarding the outcomes of the civil war in Syria. 
Eventually, the members of the parliament extended their terms until November of 
2014, before a second extension occurred for an extra three years until 2017220. 
Nonetheless, the representatives in the parliament rarely convene especially that the 
political groups have been incapable of electing a new president since the end of 
President Michel Suleiman’s term in May of 2014. 
In addition to the expanding deadlock in the political system, the security 
situation in Lebanon has been deteriorating as well. The Lebanese arena began 
witnessing new episodes of car bombs, suicide bombers, clashes among groups of 
different sects, battles with the army and even recurring incidents of kidnapping. For 
instance, Sunni villages on the borders as in the case of Akkar in the North or Arsal 
in the Bekaa became targets of the Syrian regime, either as a result of members of 
the opposition who might be crossing the borders into Lebanon or against the 
residents of the villages who may have been providing shelter, medical or material 
support to opposition groups close to the region221. Moreover, political and personal 
kidnapping in exchange for political requests or ransom respectively became a 
common form of assault. In fact, the wave of kidnapping began when in May of 
                                                             
218 (Salem, Can Lebanon Survive the Syrian Crisis, 2012, pp. 5-7) 
219 (BBC News, 2015) 
220 (BBC News, 2015) 
221 (Salem, Can Lebanon Survive the Syrian Crisis, 2012, p. 7) 
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2012 members of the opposition in Syria kidnapped a number of Shiites from 
Lebanon while they were returning from a religious visit in Iraq222. More than a year 
later in October of 2013, the kidnapped were released in exchange for the freedom of 
two Turkish men who were in turn kidnapped in Lebanon223. This incident prompted 
a series of smaller scale kidnappings across Lebanon that are mostly executed as a 
method of collecting money or for personal reasons.  
Yet, another reason why the Shiites were kidnapped in Syria was due to 
accusations that they were connected to Hezbollah224. In fact, ever since Hezbollah 
became directly involved in the war in Syria either by sending members of the 
Lebanese Islamic Resistance to fight alongside the regime in Syria, or through 
confrontations with Salafi Jihadi groups like Jabhat Al Nusra and the Islamic State of 
Iraq and Syria (ISIS) on the borders of Lebanon, adjacent to Arsal, regions in 
Lebanon with Hezbollah supporters and Shiite residents became recurrent targets of 
Salafi Jihadi groups. In Beirut, the Shiite dominated southern suburbs – or what is 
known as al-Dahiya- as well as the Hermel region in Bekaa witnessed around 10 
bombing attacks between July of 2013 and February of 2014, including a double 
attack on the Iranian embassy in Chiyah in November 19, 2013225. The assaults were 
adopted by Sunni Jihadi groups, which were among the extremist opposition groups 
fighting the Syrian regime including Jabhat al-Nusra, ISIS and the Abdallah Azzam 
group226. Eventually, a strict security plan was implemented in al-Dahiya as part of a 
                                                             
222 (Salem, Can Lebanon Survive the Syrian Crisis, 2012, pp. 9-10) 
223 (Malkin, 2013) 
224 (Salem, Can Lebanon Survive the Syrian Crisis, 2012, pp. 9-10) 
225 (The War Spreads: A Timeline of Syria-Linked Violence in Lebanon, 2014) 
226 (The War Spreads: A Timeline of Syria-Linked Violence in Lebanon, 2014) 
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greater plan for Beirut in an attempt to limit the security violations that had been 
escalating ever since the civil war broke out in Syria227.  
Other regions in Lebanon also experienced similar forms of violence. In 
Tripoli, for example, two mosques were attacked by car bombs on the 23rd of August 
2013 during Friday prayers killing more than 40 people and injuring hundreds228. 
Since the assaults took place in a Sunni region, Sunni representatives from Tripoli 
and members of the March 14 coalition in general accused the Syrian regime, and 
more specifically its allies in Tripoli represented by the Alawite Arab Democratic 
Party, of being responsible for the attacks. These claims were based upon the belief 
that the regime in Syria is also fighting the Sunnis in Lebanon due to their position as 
supporters of the opposition. The speculations against the Syrian regime especially 
increased after an earlier plan to situate explosives in the North region of Lebanon 
was exposed in 2012; the devices were transported from Syria into Lebanon with the 
help of a former minister who is a close ally of the Syrian regime229. The plot was 
uncovered by the Information Branch of the Internal Security Forces, whose head 
was assassinated shortly afterwards in October of 2012230. Later in December of 
2013, former minister Mohammad Chatah, a supporter of the Future Movement and 
March 14 coalition, was also assassinated.   
The Lebanese Armed Forces also faced – and continue to face- some battles 
of their own as a result of the increasing tension following the outbreak of the civil 
war in Syria. In addition to the security violations occurring in the various regions of 
Lebanon, the army had to handle frequent clashes between the Sunni radicals of Bab 
                                                             
227 (Beirut Security Plan Begins Next Month: Minister, 2014) 
228 (Holmes & Siddiq, 2013) 
229 (Salem, Can Lebanon Survive the Syrian Crisis, 2012, p. 10) 
230 (Salem, Can Lebanon Survive the Syrian Crisis, 2012, p. 10) 
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al-Tabbaneh and the Alawite militants of Jabal Mohsen in Tripoli. After almost 20 
rounds of confrontations between the two groups since the beginning of the civil war 
in Syria in 2011, a security plan was introduced in April of 2014 to end the 
fighting231. The army also fought a Jihadi group led by Ahmad Al Assir, who had 
formed his own extremist armed faction in Sidon. The conflict began on June 23 of 
2013 when members of Al Assir’s group attacked soldiers at a checkpoint in the area 
and the clashes continued for the next two days232. Although the battle ended shortly 
afterwards, a new battlefront was opened in August of 2014 between the Army and 
the Jihadi group of al-Nusra on the border between Arsal in the Bekaa and Syria233. 
The fighting against al-Nusra Front was also limited to a few days with the Lebanese 
Armed Forces having the upper hand in the clashes, yet the army lost a significant 
number of casualties and at least 25 soldiers and policemen have been captured as 
hostages by both the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and al-Nusra while 
negotiations for their return have been unsuccessful234. Even though the battle ended, 
the Lebanese Army enhanced its presence in the Arsal region while minor strikes 
still occur sporadically against the Jihadi groups taking shelter in the area across 
from Arsal.  
 
 
                                                             
231 (The War Spreads: A Timeline of Syria-Linked Violence in Lebanon, 2014) 
232 (Salem, Lebanese Army’s Defeat of Salafists Buys Only Short Respite, 2013) 
233 (Dziadosz & Perry, 2014) 
234 (Hassan, 2015) The two Jihadi groups have executed around 4 of the hostages. The Lebanese 
government, and specifically through the General Security unit, has been trying to negotiate with the 
kidnappers in order to secure the return of the soldiers. Several conditions have been requested by 
al-Nusra Front including an exchange between extremists held in jails in Lebanon and the soldiers, 
but the negotiations have been unsuccessful. In addition, the families of the hostages have been 
active in demanding more effort from the government, using demonstrations, sit-ins and even 
holding meetings with government officials in order to follow up on the progress of the negotiations.  
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Lebanon and the Rise of Salafi Jihadism  
Looking at the effects of the civil war in Syria on the politics and security of 
Lebanon, one major question to ask would be why is Lebanon directly affected by 
the turmoil in Syria and more importantly why has the result been the ascendancy of 
Salafi Jihadism in Lebanon? After all, Lebanon’s political system has long been 
considered the most democratic in the Arab region and thus the most immune against 
upheaval. In addition, other surrounding countries, specifically Jordan, has 
successfully protected its political system even when it is much less democratic than 
Lebanon. Jordan has also secured its territory against any form of religious 
radicalism even though the majority are Sunni Muslims in the country. Therefore, 
this is where the connection between the internal defected political system and the 
external weakness of Lebanon in the region display the link between Lebanon and 
the civil war in Syria, and ultimately the rise of Salafi Jihadism in Lebanon.   
Unlike the uprisings that took place in other countries of the Arab region like 
Egypt for example or Tunisia, the upheaval in Syria turned violent shortly after it 
first began in March of 2011. For several months after the demonstrations were 
initiated members of the opposition chose to react to the violent approach that the 
regime adopted against the activists through peaceful methods of protest235. 
However, as the demonstrations proved ineffective and the international community 
did not intervene – as it did in the case of Libya- members of the opposition also 
resorted to the use of arms as a form of defense against the regime as large numbers 
of the opposition joined the Free Syrian Army236.  Although the opposition initially 
                                                             
235 (International Crisis Group, Tentative Jihad: Syria's Fundamentalist Opposition, 2012, pp. 1-2) 
236 (International Crisis Group, Tentative Jihad: Syria's Fundamentalist Opposition, 2012, pp. 1-2) 
Although there have been talks by powers of the international community, specifically the United 
States, to intervene in Syria against the regime of Bashar Al-Assad no intervention occurred. Rather, 
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insisted on the universality of the struggle regardless of the sect or religion of the 
Syrian people, the dispute eventually transformed into a sectarian conflict. Since the 
regime in Syria is dominated by the Alawites who are a minority, while the majority 
of the people are Sunnis, a civil war broke out in the country between the regime and 
the opposition eventually provoking specific Islamist extremist groups of waging 
Jihad against the regime in Syria237.  Yet, how is the civil war in Syria connected to 
the rise of political deficiencies in Lebanon and the rise of Salafi Jihadism in the 
country?   
One, since the sectarian identity in Lebanon overshadows the national 
identity and members of the various sectarian groups often affiliate themselves with 
members of the same sect across the borders of the country, the Sunni-Alawite 
conflict in Syria was easily transferred into Lebanon in the form of a Sunni-
Shiite/Alawite division. As the Sunnis of the country allied themselves with the 
Sunni opposition, Shiites and the Alawite minority of Lebanon supported the Alawite 
regime. Moreover, since the struggle in Syria drifted away from being solely a fight 
for a better form of governance or values like freedom and equality, sectarian 
resentment escalated thus pushing Sunni and Shiite sympathizers in Lebanon – as in 
Syria- to defend their ally and challenge their opponent based on religious beliefs 
and even Salafi Jihadi convictions.  
In fact, the civil war in Syria contributed to the already existing suspicion 
between the Sunnis and Shiites of Lebanon and thus provoked the rise of Salafi 
Jihadism in Lebanon. Since Hezbollah, the major representative of the Shiites in 
                                                                                                                                                                            
an international alliance was formed in 2014 to initiate attacks, mostly in the form of airstrikes, 
against the growing power of ISIS especially in Iraq. In addition to Western countries, countries from 
the Gulf have also joined the alliance.  
237 (International Crisis Group, Tentative Jihad: Syria's Fundamentalist Opposition, 2012, pp. 1-3)  
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Lebanon, supported the regime of Bashar Al Assad, both of which are allies of Iran, 
Sunnis in Lebanon referred to the war in Syria as part of the Shiite plan led by Iran to 
spread its influence over the Sunni Arab world. This interpretation of the events in 
Syria is reinforced by the growing division between the Sunnis of the region 
represented by Saudi Arabia and other countries of the Gulf and the Shiites 
represented by Iran. Therefore, in order to fulfill their duty towards their sectarian 
allies by assisting them to restrict the power of the Shiites in the region and in 
Lebanon, some Sunni groups took up arms and announced a war of Jihad against all 
supporters of the Syrian regime, in Lebanon and even across the border in Syria. 
Another factor that facilitated the growth of a radical approach towards the 
events in Syria and their effects on Lebanon is the weak role of the official Sunni 
representation in Lebanon and particularly religious institutions like Dar al-Fatwa. 
The Sunni community has criticized the role of Dar al-Fatwa on several occasions, 
especially as the war in Syria developed, due to corruption scandals and accusations 
that the former Mufti was a supporter of Hezbollah, before a new Mufti was lately 
elected in August of 2014238. This position towards the official religious 
representation of the Sunnis in Lebanon reduced the effectiveness of a moderate 
position towards the ongoing Sunni-Shiite rivalry and the civil war in Syria, and 
instead enabled the radical ideologies to expand. In fact, according to an official 
Sunni representative from Dar al-Fatwa, the war in Syria does not represent a 
situation where a Jihad war is needed, since the conflict is merely an internal issue 
that occurred as a result of a strict form of governance that has been employed for 
several years239.  
                                                             
238 (Lefèvre, Lebanon's Dar al-Fatwa and The Search for Moderation, 2015) 
239 (Sheikh Malek Al Shaar, 2014) 
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Two, the urge to defend the Sunni community in Lebanon against the 
growing power of Hezbollah in particular and the Shiites in general further 
intensified due to the presumed idea that the Sunnis in Lebanon are economically 
and socially marginalized and politically misrepresented. This belief enhanced the 
fears of the Sunni community of being dominated by a Shiite power, and pushed 
Salafists in the country to act separately in order to protect the Sunni community in 
Lebanon and in Syria. For example, political salafists or Islamist activists organized 
numerous demonstrations – especially in Tripoli- and participated in several talk 
shows and interviews in order to express their discontent with the position of the 
state on the civil war in Syria and to emphasize their support for the rebels. As for 
the Salafi Jihadi groups in Lebanon, they recruited men from Lebanon to cross into 
Syria and fight alongside the opposition, including al-Nusra for example as well as 
other similar Jihadi groups240. Even some political Salafist groups in Lebanon do not 
deny providing material support for rebels across the borders in Syria241. In fact, 
smuggling weapons into Syria especially from Sunni villages on the borders like 
Akkar for instance or the Bekaa, became recurrent and assisting injured Syrian 
fighters crossing the borders into Lebanon to seek medical help also became 
widespread.  
Three, the direct intervention of Hezbollah in the fight in Syria alongside the 
regime further increased the Sunni-Shiite division in Lebanon and aggravated the 
extremists’ resentment towards the state and particularly the security institutions of 
the country. According to the radical groups, Hezbollah’s involvement in the 
struggle in Syria is not only another form of aggression towards the Sunnis of the 
region, but also a demonstration of bias by the state towards the Sunni community in 
                                                             
240 (Lefèvre, The Roots of Crisis in Northern Lebanon, 2014, p. 12) 
241 (Sheikh Salem Al Rafei, 2014) 
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Lebanon. The radical Sunnis of Lebanon, and even a significant group of the 
moderate Sunnis of the country, pointed out the disparity between allowing 
Hezbollah to posses an armed branch and cross the borders into Syria while Sunni 
activists are being arrested and some have been jailed for years without facing 
trial242. A frequently asked question among the Sunnis of Lebanon became why 
Hezbollah can but the Sunnis cannot.  
In fact, such positions intensified especially among the radical Sunni 
community in Lebanon when in 2012 a Sunni activist who sympathizes with the 
opposition in Syria, Shadi Al-Mawlawi was arrested by the General Security office 
in Lebanon and later when a Sunni cleric was killed at an army checkpoint in the 
North243. In the case of the first, protests broke out especially in Tripoli where 
Salafists of the region condemned the actions of the state and accused the authorities 
of supporting the Syrian regime244. Eventually, Mawlawi was released before 
becoming an active Salafi Jihadi fighter in the clashes between Jabal Mohsen and 
Bab al-Tabbaneh in Tripoli and a close ally of ISIS assisting the Jihadi group in 
recruiting fighters from Lebanon245. Even following the killing of the Sunni Sheikh, 
Salafists took to the streets to denounce the incident and minor clashes broke out in 
Beirut between supporters of the Syrian regime and opposition sympathizers.246  
                                                             
242 (International Crisis Group, A Precarious Balancing Act: Lebanon and the Syrian Conflict, 2012, p. 
4) A large number of Islamists were jailed following the battle of Nahr al-Bared between the army 
and the Jihadi group of Fath al-Islam in 2007. However, the Islamists’ trial has been delayed ever 
since even though the amount of time they have been detained may have surpassed their sentence 
periods if they had been put on trial. In addition, the government tried to handle the issue of the 
prisoners in a faster manner following the kidnapping of army soldiers by al-Nusra and ISIS during 
the latter’s battle with the army in Arsal in August of 2014.  
243 (Lefèvre, The Roots of Crisis in Northern Lebanon, 2014, p. 12) 
244 (Salem, Lebanon Edges Closer to Syrian Crisis, 2012) 
245 (Saab A. G., 2015) 
246 (Lefèvre, The Roots of Crisis in Northern Lebanon, 2014, p. 12) 
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Four, even though the radical Sunnis of Lebanon accuse the Sunni 
representation in the country of failing to defend the Sunni rights or empower the 
Sunni community in its fight against the Shiites whether in Lebanon or in Syria, 
some of the Sunni political parties and actors in Lebanon used the growing wave of 
Islamists extremism in the country to serve their own political and sectarian agendas. 
Although this issue remains controversial in Lebanon, several reports point out that a 
number of Salafi fighters, particularly in Tripoli, have been supplied with financial 
and armed support from Sunni political actors from within the system in Lebanon247. 
While the initial aim of the parties providing the support is to establish groups that 
are capable of challenging the power of Hezbollah and induce pressure on the 
politics of the country due to their radical approach, the strategy failed when the 
power of the violent groups expanded even beyond the control of political actors.  
 
Case Studies: Tripoli and Sidon 
Following the Israeli invasion of Beirut in 1982 and the heavy attacks that the 
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) faced, members of the movement along 
with their leader Yasser Arafat withdrew form Beirut to Al Badawi refugee camp in 
Tripoli. Since the Syrian army wanted the PLO completely out of Lebanon, the 
fighting did not stop. Eventually, the Palestinian movement was forced out of the 
country following defeat by the Syrian troops even though it had been backed by 
several of the local pan-Arab groups in Tripoli and even Islamists248. 
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One of the allies of the PLO in Tripoli was the Islamic Unity Movement 
(Harakat al Tawheed) that operated under the leadership of Sheikh Said Shaaban. 
Even though the PLO had lost its battle against Syria, the Islamic Unity Movement 
continued to fight in an attempt to defeat Syria and spread its extremist Islamist 
ideology in Tripoli. In fact, from 1983 until 1985 the Islamic Unity Movement 
succeeded to take control over the city and force its radical regulations249. The 
movement, along with its allies like the Popular Resistance and the Arabic Lebanese 
Movement, believed that the Sharia law had to be implemented and that an Islamic 
rule must be established in Lebanon as an alternative to the then employed political 
system and Arab regimes.  
Nonetheless, the success of the Islamic Unity Movement was short-lived due 
to both internal division within the movement and the continuous Syrian attacks on 
Tripoli250. Even though Sheikh Shaaban managed to leave Lebanon as Syria took 
control over Tripoli, the outcomes of the fighting between the supporters of the 
Islamist movement and Syria – as well as some of its local allies- still affect the 
present day politics of Tripoli as well as Lebanon. Following an attack that killed 
Syrian soldiers in December of 1985, Syria retaliated by a heavy strike on Bab al- 
Tabbaneh, causing a massacre that both Syria and its Alawite allies of Jabal Mohsen 
were held responsible for251. Ever since, hostility grew between the residents of both 
sides – Bab al-Tabbaneh and Jabal Mohsen-, thus representing anti-Syrian Sunnis 
and Alawite Syrian supporters respectively.   
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Even though the rivalry continued to exist even after the civil war came to an 
end, and small scale clashes did occur occasionally between the two sides, three 
major events awakened the hostilities after 2005; the assassination of Prime Minister 
Rafik Al Hariri in February of 2005, the Beirut clashes of May 7 in 2008 and the 
onset of the civil war in Syria in 2011. Each of these incidents contributed in a way 
of its own to the Sunni-Alawite resentment that exists between Bab al-Tabbaneh and 
Jabal Mohsen, eventually deepening the sectarian division and giving way for the re-
emergence of Islamist activists in the region, both political and jihadi. 
In 2005, a major Sunni figure Prime Minister Rafik Al Hariri was 
assassinated and the accusations were directly pointed towards Syria252. The Sunni 
feelings of suspicion, distrust and fear of losing their influence in the balance of 
power in the country of course reached Sunni residents of Bab al-Tabbaneh. The 
residents of the two areas, like the majority of the people in Lebanon divided 
between the two camps that took over the politics of the country, March 14 as an 
opposition to Syria and its presence in Lebanon and March 8 as allies of the Syrian 
regime. Thus, as the Sunnis of Bab al-Tabbaneh rallied behind their new leader Saad 
al Hariri, the Alawites of Jabal Mohsen re-emphasized their support to Syria.  
Ultimately, the local allies of Syria in Lebanon, specifically members of the 
March 8 coalition, became the rivals of the March 14 bloc and thus were considered 
partners in the “destabilization plan” against Lebanon under Syrian directions. Yet, 
since a primary actor of the March 14 bloc was the Sunni Future Movement of the 
Hariri family, while the Shiite Hezbollah and Amal were major actors of the March 8 
alliance, the pro-Syrian and anti-Syrian dispute began to take a sectarian dimension 
represented by the Sunnis on one side and the Shiites on the other. The first signs of 
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the growing hostility between the sects appeared during the 2006 war between 
Hezbollah and Israel. When Hezbollah kidnapped two Israeli soldiers, Israel 
retaliated by heavy attacks on Lebanon, thus starting more than a month long war 
between the two sides253. Although Hezbollah justified the kidnapping as a means to 
free Lebanese prisoners from Israeli jails in an exchange process – which actually 
took place when the war came to a halt- and Shiites in Lebanon celebrated what they 
considered a victory for Hezbollah, the Sunnis blamed Hezbollah and the party’s 
hasty decisions for the economic, infrastructure and more importantly human losses. 
According to local parties who are in opposition to Hezbollah, the July war of 2006 
was merely a strategy in order to prove that Hezbollah’s arms are still necessary for 
defending Lebanon against Israel254.  
A second incident that demonstrated the opposition that was growing towards 
Hezbollah from the Sunni side of the Future Movement was the decisions 
implemented by the Siniora government that affected the telecommunication system 
of Hezbollah and called for the replacement of the highest member of the security 
apparatus in the airport who was an ally of the party255. As a reaction to these 
decisions, armed members of Hezbollah as well as others from Amal occupied the 
streets of Beirut in May 7 of 2008 as they fought against Sunni supporters of the 
Future Movement256. Ever since, the division between the Sunnis and the 
Shiites/Alawites reached its highest levels and demands for the disarmament of 
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Hezbollah’s weapons became recurrent among Christian and Sunni members of the 
March 14 coalition as well as the people who supported the bloc257.  
For members of the Sunni community who resided in Bab al-Tabbaneh, the 
events of May 7 were another hint that the power of the Sunnis in Lebanon may be at 
risk and that their role may be overshadowed by the rising power of the Shiites 
represented by Hezbollah. Eventually, when the Syrian uprisings turned violent and 
the mainly Sunni opposition entered into a confrontation with the Alawite regime, 
the Sunnis of Bab al-Tabbaneh were more convinced of the Sunni-Shiite power 
struggle that is occurring within Lebanon, Syria and the region as a whole.  
One, the Sunnis of Bab al-Tabbaneh had already been economically 
vulnerable as their region is among the poorest in the country. A report by the UN 
ESCWA in 2014 indicates that 87% of the families in Bab al-Tabbaneh are 
considered deprived and 52% are considered severely deprived258. Therefore, 
feelings of being marginalized had long existed in the region. Two, like other sects in 
Lebanon the Sunnis of Bab al-Tabbaneh and the Awalites of Jabal Mohsen have 
allied themselves with a local political party that represents their sect and more 
importantly built an affiliation with an external political power that they share a 
common sect with. Consequently, the Alawites ally with Hezbollah, Syria and Iran 
and the Sunnis with mainly the Future Movement, Saudi Arabia and other countries 
of the Gulf. In return for financial support and protection whether through politics or 
providing them with arms, the local sects become clients of those groups providing 
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not only verbal support or votes during elections, but also serving them during proxy 
confrontations. 
Three, in Lebanon the feelings of suspicion among the people in the 
Tabbaneh were met with sectarian speeches and statements of Sunni representatives, 
accusing Hezbollah of supporting the plans of the Syrian regime within Lebanon and 
condemning the Hezbollah, Iran, Syria alliance that is aiming at overshadowing the 
powers of the Sunnis in the region. Similar charges were also voiced by Sunni 
powers of the region, like Saudi Arabia and other countries of the gulf, which the 
Sunnis of Lebanon often ally with. On the other side, members of the Hezbollah 
party, and allies of Syria and Iran have also been accusing the Sunnis and the Sunni 
powers of the region of conspiring with the West to induce instability in the region. 
As a result, rather than quieting the sectarian resentments, political parties and 
representatives further intensified the division.  
Four, some of the local political parties as well as regional political powers 
used their clients in Bab al-Tabbaneh and Jabal Mohsen to settle their larger local 
and regional struggles over the balance of power. The patrons provided material 
funding to the fighters in al Tabbaneh and Jabal Mohsen either in the form of 
financial or armed support259. Attacking the Alawite Jabal Mohsen – an ally of 
Hezbollah and Syria- from the Sunni Bab al-Tabbaneh, and vice versa, served as a 
venue of retaliation between the contending political parties in Lebanon and even in 
the region, in the form of an small-scaled internal by proxy civil dispute. For 
instance, militants in Bab al-Tabbaneh and Jabal Mohsen began a new round of 
conflict when Hezbollah became more involved in the battle against the Jihadi 
groups in May of 2013, specifically in the fights of the Qalamoun region bordering 
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Arsal260. Similarly, other rounds of fighting were initiated following incidents like 
the assassination of the head of the Information Branch of the Internal Security 
Forces, or the loss of pro-opposition fighters in Syria or even due to an escalation of 
tension between the supporters of the regime in Jabal Mohsen and the supporters of 
the rebels in Bab al-Tabbaneh261.  
Eventually, the Jihadists of Bab al-Tabbaneh gained enough power to release 
themselves from the control of the political parties in Lebanon. Several of the Jihadi 
groups of Bab al-Tabbaneh became independent actors with a freedom to act 
according to their extremist beliefs, thus widening their circle of assaults to include 
soldiers in the army, civil Alawites crossing to reach their homes in Jabal Mohsen 
and even businesses owned by Alawites in the region262. As a result, after almost 20 
rounds of clashes between Jabal Mohsen and Bab al-Tabbaneh, the army introduced 
a security plan to end the hostilities on April 1 of 2014263. Even though the plan had 
been successful, Sunni Jihadi groups and Sunni Jihadi activists from Bab al-
Tabbaneh were capable of developing networks of their own, thus becoming 
independent and more active in the struggle against the Syrian regime and 
Hezbollah, either by joining the Salafi Jihadi groups in their battles against the 
regime, or by recruiting fighters from Lebanon to assist the Jihadi opposition groups 
in Syria or even by supplying the rebels with different forms of material support.  
The deepening Sunni-Shiite division in Lebanon as a result of the ongoing 
civil war in Syria, as well as the sectarian speeches and the growing opposition to the 
arms of Hezbollah and the party’s involvement in the war in Syria gave way to the 
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emergence of Salafi Jihadism in Sidon as well. The Jihadi group was established by 
Ahmad Al Assir, a Sunni Jihadist who began his movement as an ally of the Syrian 
opposition fighting the regime of Bashar Al Assad in Syria, and an opponent to the 
weapons of Hezbollah. Al Assir used sit-ins and demonstrations as well as other 
peaceful methods of protests as a first approach to express his position. In addition, 
due to the growing tension in the country a number of citizens in Sidon rallied 
around Ahmad Al Assir as supporters of his stand with the Syrian opposition and 
more importantly against the growing power of Hezbollah.   
The state tolerated the actions of Ahmad Al Assir until June of 2013. 
Although Al Assir had resorted to peaceful methods during his early stages of 
activism in Sidon, the real objectives of his group were revealed when members of 
Al Assir’s movement attacked soldiers at an army checkpoint in the region264. Soon 
afterwards on June 23 clashes broke out in Abra in Sidon between followers of Al 
Assir and the Lebanese Armed Forces. According to Al Assir, fighting the army was 
part of the Sunni duty to defend the sect against infidels in Lebanon, whether they 
were Shiites in general or members of Hezbollah in particular, or even governmental 
institutions that failed to disarm Hezbollah or diminish its power in Lebanon265. The 
clashes ended two days later on June 25 with Al Assir and several of his followers 
fleeing the region. Eventually, and almsot two years after the clashes occurred in 
Abra of Sidon, Ahmad Al Assir was arrested on August 15 of 2015266.  
Nonetheless, the events of Abra were controversial in Lebanon. Several 
members of the Sunni community voiced their support for Ahmad Al Assir’s 
peaceful activism against the disparities between the powers of the Sunnis and the 
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Shiites in Lebanon including political parties and actors in the country267. In fact, 
when Al Assir’s group launched its attack against the army, the actions of the 
movement were justified by pointing out to the armed branch of Hezbollah and the 
state’s lack of action towards the disarmament of the party. Adding to that, a 
significant number of the Sunni community raised doubts around the role of the army 
in the fights in Abra since it was accused of being assisted by Hezbollah and 
criticized for it repressive treatment of some of the detainees from the region268. The 
growing sectarian tension did not only facilitate the emergence of Al Assir’s jihadi 
group in Saida due to the growing hostility between the Sunnis and the Shiites, but 
also convinced a large number of the Sunni community of the need to fight the Shiite 
power, in Lebanon and the region, even it were through an extremist Jihadi approach.   
 
How is Lebanon Different 
The sect-based political system in Lebanon hindered the work of the public 
institutions in Lebanon and weakened the position of the country in the region, thus 
allowing the political changes and challenges of the region to easily cross the borders 
into Lebanon. Among the challenges absorbed by the Lebanese arena is Salafi 
Jihadism, a product of the Sunni-Shiite division in Lebanon and the civil war in 
Syria. Yet, even though Lebanon had to deal with – and is still dealing with- a new 
wave of Salafi Jihadism, the influence and power of the Salafi Jihadi ideology has so 
far been limited. Unlike surrounding countries in the region, like Syria for example 
or Iraq, Salafi Jihadi activists remain a minority in Lebanon with little chance to take 
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over the politics of the country. Yet, what factors instigate the type of relationship 
that exists between Lebanon and the Salafi Jihadism? 
First, Lebanon and a majority of the political parties in the country have 
already experienced a 15 years civil war that destroyed the lives of civilians due to 
fear, insecurity, casualties and immense damage to the economy and the 
infrastructure. Therefore, the political actors in Lebanon as well as the people know 
the dangers of provoking a sectarian strife in the country and thus act accordingly to 
diminish the possibility of a new civil war erupting. One way of doing so is by 
containing the sectarian tension – as much as possible-, by encouraging dialogue 
among the various political groups, fighting sectarian suspicion and distrust as well 
as preventing radical ideologies from spreading across Lebanon. In addition, since 
none of the sects constitutes an absolute majority, political actors in Lebanon are 
well aware that none can dominate the politics of the country without an alliance or 
any other form of collaboration with other groups in the country.  
Second, facilitating the development of the Salafi Jihadi ideology may 
increase the number of Salafi Jihadi groups in Lebanon and thus a growth in their 
popularity and influence. Such changes threaten the continuity of the political system 
in Lebanon especially if the system was challenged by the rising power of Salafi 
Jihadi groups in the country. Of course, since the take over of the system by radicals 
is a disadvantage for the various moderate political groups in Lebanon –whether 
among the Muslims or the Christians-, the authorities will exert an effort in limiting 
the power of the Salafi Jihadi groups in Lebanon as well as the effect of the Jihadi 
ideology.  
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Third, Lebanon’s population is divided between Muslims and Christians. 
Even though the latter group does not make up the majority, Christians in Lebanon 
are still essential actors in the political system that can defuse the effects of the 
Sunni-Shiite division in the country. On one hand, the Christians are backed by 
countries of the West that seek to protect the presence of the Christians of Lebanon 
in the Muslim dominated Arab region. Therefore, the Christians’ external allies are 
well –aware of the dangers of a Jihadi take over in Lebanon and are thus committed 
to the protection of the Christians against any attempt to push them out of the region 
or decrease their power. On the other hand, the Sunni and Shiite political groups of 
Lebanon are also in need of alliances with the Christians of the country. The power 
of the Sunni parties and the Shiites is not sufficient to achieve political gains in the 
local politics of Lebanon and pursue the interests of the two Muslim communities. 
As a result, Sunni and Shiite parties turn to Christians to increase their sphere of 
support whether during elections or at times of disagreement over governmental 
decisions. Yet, the Muslim parties are more likely to receive the support they need 
from the Christian parties when they show moderate rather than extremist principles 
that would not threaten the Christian community.  
Finally, although the sectarian political system of Lebanon possesses a 
significant number of deficiencies that has negatively affected the political cycle and 
ultimately hindered the economic, social and security conditions in the country, the 
consociational system still offers a number of democratic values. Unlike other 
countries of the Arab world, the people in Lebanon have enjoyed a certain degree of 
freedom in expression and information. The people and the media are often allowed 
to criticize the system as well as the political actors, competitive parliamentary 
elections are held, a large number of political parties exists, civil society is given a 
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freedom to act and several rights and values are protected by the law. The absence of 
such elements from the systems of other countries of the Arab world was a primary 
trigger of the Arab uprisings. Among the protesting groups are Islamists with 
extremist agendas aiming at employing religious political system that is based on the 
Sharia law. In addition, the electoral threshold presented by the parliamentary 
electoral law in Lebanon prevents small parties from entering the political structure 
of the country. Although the high threshold is an advantage to the already dominant 
political parties while preventing secular parties and independent candidates from 
reaching the political system, it reduces the chances of an extremist Islamist party to 
enter the system as well. After all, and unlike the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt or 
Ennahda in Tunisia, Islamist parties in Lebanon lack the needed amount of support to 
pass the electoral threshold and attain an official representation in the parliament in 
Lebanon.  
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Conclusion 
 
When the Arab uprisings began to spread throughout the Arab region, Lebanon 
was the only Arab state with a political system that offered the people relatively sufficient 
freedom to prevent an upheaval against the ruling authorities. Nonetheless, the sect-based 
consociational system of Lebanon failed to entirely shield the country against the effects 
of the political changes and the growing security threats in the region. In fact, the 
employed political system contributed to an increased sense of dissatisfaction among the 
various subcultures in Lebanon and eventually a deeper sectarian division, a defected 
political system, a weak regional and international position and a hospitable environment 
for Salafi Jihadism to grow and survive.   
On the internal level, the consociational system matched the needs of the 
heterogeneous demography of Lebanon, especially after the expansion of the country’s 
territory in 1920269. However, as the numbers of every sect changed – either increasing or 
becoming more of a minority in proportion to the other-, discontent with the sect-based 
power distribution that had been implemented as per the National Pact of 1943 further 
escalated leading to the first major collapse of the system characterized by the 15 years of 
civil war from 1975 until 1990. Although the power sharing formula had been reformed 
through the Taif of 1989, the deficiencies of the sect-based consociational system later 
resurfaced after the assassination of Prime Minister Rafik Al Hariri in 2005, the 
withdrawal of Syria that same year and the rise of sectarian tension in the country. As 
events like the war with Israel in 2006, the sectarian clashes in Beirut in 2008 and the 
several assassinations and assassinations attempts dominated the politics of Lebanon, 
deadlock and ministerial resignation became recurrent outcomes in the country.  
                                                             
269 (Salamey, The Government and Politics of Lebanon, 2014, pp. 14-37) 
 110 
The sectarian political system also empowered the sect – and more specifically 
the leader of the sect- that is often represented through a political party over the state, 
thus weakening the deterrence capabilities of the state and producing patronage networks 
that political representatives use to preserve their shares of power in the system. As a 
result, several of the groups in Lebanon claim to be marginalized by the system including 
a portion of the Sunnis who frequently point out the social and economic troubles of the 
Sunni regions in Lebanon and often blame their struggle on the official Sunni 
representation, whether in the parliament, the cabinet or any other branch of the 
government. Although a major number of the Sunnis criticize the state peacefully, some 
have found an alternative in extremist religious ideologies including Salafi Jihadism. The 
poor economic conditions, the absence of the right employment opportunities, young age 
and the feelings of sectarian marginalization met with distrust towards the official 
authorities and the security forces of Lebanon, are all products of the deficient sect-based 
consociational system and factors that facilitated the rise of Salafi Jihadism in the 
country.  
On the regional level, the sectarian division in Lebanon resulted in skepticism 
among the various sects and produced a need among the sectarian communities and 
political parties to look across the borders of Lebanon for protection. In fact, since the 
subgroups in Lebanon share their sectarian identities with different countries in the 
region, they enjoy the opportunity to build alliances with regional powers as a form of 
security against a possible change in the local balance of power in favor of a rival group 
or sect. Yet, this form of connection with external actors also serves as a gateway for the 
powers of the region to use their patrons in Lebanon as well as the political arena in the 
country to settle their disputes by proxy and reflect their struggle for regional hegemony. 
Eventually, these external characteristics of Lebanon, including the sectarian affiliations 
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that the political actors build across the borders, enable the movement of regional 
conflicts and radical ideologies into Lebanon including Salafi Jihadism.  
The hazards of the sectarian division in Lebanon along with a defected 
consociational system, regional weakness and a sectarian sense of identity that 
overshadows the national identity have most recently been revealed through the political 
deadlock and security violations that have dominated the arena in Lebanon ever since the 
civil war began in Syria in 2011. In fact, two factors that stand out in the connection that 
exists between the sectarian division in Lebanon and the rise of Salafi Jihadism in the 
country are the internal economic deprivation of a significant number of members of the 
Sunni community, combined with the intensified Sunni-Shiite division in the region that 
has also manifested itself in social and political sectarian division in Lebanon. Due to 
their poor economic and social conditions, some members of the Sunni community build 
loyalties and adopt Salafi Jihadi ideologies as an attempt to improve their economic 
conditions through the implementation of religious laws, as well as to replace the official 
Sunni representation in the country and even to support other Sunnis within Lebanon and 
across the borders in wars that they perceive as a Jihad.  
As the uprisings to call for a different form of governance in Syria turned into a 
sectarian war between the Sunni majority of the people and the Alawite dominated 
regime, the Sunni-Shiite division in Lebanon intensified. In fact, among the most serious 
consequences to the civil war in Syria is the rise of a new wave of Salafi Jihadism in 
Lebanon. The growing power of Hezbollah and the direct involvement of the party in the 
battles in Syria alongside the regime and against the opposition aggravated the Sunni 
resentment towards the Shiites in Lebanon. Therefore, the position of the Sunni 
community on Hezbollah’s military intervention in Syria and the battles being fought on 
the borders of Lebanon against Salafi Jihadi groups has been expressed in two ways. The 
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first is through intense criticism through speeches and statements of political figures in 
Lebanon who are often members of the March 14 coalition or supporters of the 
opposition in Syria. As for the second, it is through carrying weapons and establishing 
radical armed groups either as an attempt to match the power of Hezbollah, or to join the 
fighting in Syria against the regime or even to help the Sunni community regain its rights 
by defending it against infidels whether they were members of other sects in Lebanon – 
especially the Shiites and Alawites- or members of the security forces of the country.  
Two events that show the depth of the division between the Sunni and the Shiites 
in Lebanon and prove the link that exists between sectarian division, internal and external 
political weakness and the rise of Salafi Jihadism in Lebanon are the Sunni-Alawite 
clashes of Jabal Mohsen and Bab al-Tabbaneh in Tripoli and the army battle with Ahmad 
Al Assir’s group in Sidon in 2013. Both occurrences marked a new stage of 
confrontations between the state in Lebanon and Salafi Jihadism, as well as an additional 
shortcoming of the sectarian based political system and social division in Lebanon. Yet, 
the events also asserted that even though Salafi Jihadism can grow and survive in 
Lebanon, certain characteristics of the social composition and the political system in 
Lebanon, previous experiences in history and the consequences that could result from a 
single political miscalculation draw a limit to the extent to which Salafi Jihadism can 
develop and expand within Lebanon. In addition to the experience of 15 years of civil 
war, the democratic features of the political system and the certain degree of freedom that 
exists in the country, the presence of a significant Christian community in Lebanon – 
although a minority- that is backed by the west and that both the Sunnis and the Shiites 
need, as well as the fear of Jihadi dominance have compelled the state to react firmly to 
the growing extremism in Tripoli and Sidon as well as other parts of Lebanon.  
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Nevertheless, the outcomes that Lebanon has so far experienced as a result of the 
turmoil in Syria suggest that sectarianism in Lebanon and the sect-based consociational 
system are problematic political features. The deficiency of the system does not emanate 
from the consociational constituent of it but rather from the sectarian dimension of its 
application in Lebanon. Of course, one can also argue that sectarianism is also embedded 
in society and among members of the various communities in Lebanon and thus the 
challenge lies in eliminating the sectarian distrust that exists among the people. Yet, this 
distrust has been further encouraged by the sectarian political system that has been 
incapable of distributing equally to the people, thus fostering feelings of marginalization 
and suspicion among the different groups. In addition, the people have been pushed to 
rely on the services of the sect rather than the state since the latter has been 
overshadowed by the power of the political parties and “zaims”. Therefore, the answer to 
the ongoing troubles in Lebanon is to reduce the gap between the various sects in 
Lebanon as a first step in the process of eliminating the sectarian element from the 
country’s politics and empowering the national interest and identity over the sectarian 
one. In addition, as the sectarian division decreases and economic conditions improve, 
the Sunni-Shiite rivalry in the region and its consequences – in the form of radicalism- 
would then perhaps have a limited effect on the politics of Lebanon and a smaller chance 
of importing its repercussions into the country.  
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